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CHAPlER I
ATTITUDES EVIDENT IN 1919
An overwhelming majority of the
American people is in favor of
the League of Nations.

When President Wilson made this statement in an address
at the .Metropolitan Opera House in New York City on March 4,
1919, the day before sailing back to France, he set many an
American mind to thinking and questioning.

Here he had made

a statement presented as a fact and many an alert American
queried the reliability of it.

How did he know?

How was

it humanly possible for anyone to know?
Still there are ways of sounding opinion.

one such way

is to ask newspaper editors allover the country, as each of
them, no doubt, watches the drift of opinion in his district,
and his own opinion tends to guide that of his :readers.
is just what the Literary Digestd:ld.

That

The editor of this

magazine sent to the editor of every daily newspaper in the
United states a letter asking his attitude toward joining "the
proposed League of Nations".2

He was then asked to tell, if

pOSSible, the attitude of his community toward it.

The respon

seemingly broke all records for 1,377 editors replied.
1 Woodrow Wilson, The Hope of the World, Harper and
Brothers, New York, 1920,~2.
----2 The Literp Dige st, ]'unk and Wagna11s Co., New York,
April 5, ~9, 9-1 •
1

...

~--------------------~a~--
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In answer to the question, "Do you favor the proposed
League of Nations?", the results showed that 718 of the
editors replied "Yes"; 181 answered "No"; and 478 voted
"Conditional".3
Another means of anal71$ing the replies to this press
poll is by the circulation of the cooperating newspapers.
The follOwing table shows this most clearly.
Total Circulation of
Replying Newspapers 4
Independent
For ••. ~ ••••• 9,886,449
Against ••••• 4,326,882
Conditional 6,792,461
~1,005,79~

For••••.•.• 3,648,141
Against •••• 2,955,706*
Conditional 2,447,660

9,051,507

*Including the 2,488,976
circulation of the Hearst
papers.
Democratic

lor ••••••••. 4,327,052
Against.....
121,912
Conditional
508,384

4,957,348

3
4

-Ibid.,

~.,

13.
9.

Republican
For •••••••• 1,911,256
Against •••• 1,249,264
Conditional 3,836,417

6,996,937

In studying this press poll of opinion we must realize

that it was taken early in April, while the Covenant of the
League was st ill in the Conference and before it
to the Senate.

1II8S

presented.

The attitudes reflected in the results are not

colored one way or the other by the debates and reaction to the
League Covenant in the Senate.
Two further pOints deserve emphasis.

If we are to

regard this poll as the people of 1919 did, we Will think of
it as only a straw vote.
any final way.

It attempted to prove nothing in

No such investigation ever can.

But it

afforded some basiS for a guess -- indeed, an excellent basis
and it was considered the best indication short of a national
vote.
Some of the opinions quoted were those of small newspapers in small communities, and many may think that these
opinions should not be considered as important enough to
warrant an analysis, however, half the people lived in small
communities.

Those newspapers reflected the opinions of

farmers, of miners, of village shopkeepers.

Not infrequently

they were more definitely in line witb local sentiment than
were the large newspapers of large oommunities.

Not

infrequently they offset the influenoe of metropolitan
journals oirculating in small communities.

Their numbers all

4

told were impressive.

What they may have lacked in

individual importance they made up in aggregate importance.
To show the :results on a nationwide basis the
accompanying map illustrates the sectional variations of
the attitude of the American people toward the proposed
League of Nations.

r-""-,,_------------""'-------·--.·-----··-··
I

!
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This map

sho~the

country divided into nine sections,

geographical sections along state lines.

The number of votes

refers to the opinlt:ons of the 1,377 editors replying to the
press poll of ~he Literary Digest.5
In no section of the COlmtry do we find eVidence of a

definite and overwhelming dislike of the League of Nations.
Rather it seems that the people in April 1919 wanted to gain
admission to the proposed League.
Another means that was used to learn the attitude of
a specific group toward the League of Nations was the poll
of the faculties and students of the colleges and universities
of the country.
Much attention and publicity were attracted to this
poll due partly to the discussions in the Senate over the
returns.

Senator Hitchcock, of Nebraska, introduced into

the COJ,?gressional,Record. a synop*is of the returns and that
started the bitter debates. 6
In these discussions is given a very complete and

detailed accolmt of the manner in which the poll was conducted.
Blank ballots were submitted to the faculties and students.

5

Ibid.
-.

6 COngreSSiOnal Record, United States Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1920, v.59, pt.l, 1276-1283

pi
These ballots stated the following questions:
1.
2.
:3 •
4.

I favor ratifioation of League and
Treaty without reservations and
amendment s.
I am opposed to ratification in any form.
I favor rat ifioat ion of the Treaty but
only with the Lodge reservations.
I favor a oompromise between the Lodge
and the Demooratio reservations in
order to facilitate ratification. 7

These blank ballots were approved by Senator Lodge and
Senator Hitchoock each representing the opposite ViewpOint.
Two arguments were placed before the students and faoulties
in printed form, one was prepared by Senator Lodge and the
other by Senator Hitchoock.

Senator Lodge argued for

ratifioation with the Lodge reservations while Senator
Hitohoook opposed the Lodge reservations, but stated that
reservations had become. inevitable.

Senator Hitohcook

maintained:
I did not oontend at all for ratifioation
without compromise. I maintained that the
only praotioal question was what reservation
Should be taken, and urged a oompromise
between the Lodge and Democratio
re servat ions.

Therefore despite the fact that no argument was presente

in tavor of simple ratification the largest vote polled,
7
8

Ib id.,
-Cong.

1281.
~.,

v.59, pt.l, 2182.

7

about 45~, was for unqualified ratification.

About 3~

voted for compromise :reservations, about 2~ for the Lodge
reservations, and less than
any form,

l~

against ratification in
300 colleges reported. 9

This referendum, oontaining the basic proportions of
the two main politioal parties, was voted upon early in
February 1920, with 410 oolleges reporting, which showed an
inorease of 110 colleges over the previous total of 300.
In these 410 colleges and universities 139,788 votes were
oast.

The results given out by the press oontain the

following figures:
Compromise between the Lodge and Demooratio
reservations --------------------------- 49,653 votes
Ratifioation without reservation ------- 48t23~
Ratification with the Lodge reservation
27,970
10
Opposition to the treaty in any form --- 13,933
Even the ohief proponent in the Senate for the League,
Senator Hitohoock, in referring to the final results stated:
This shows a sentiment for uncompromising
and unqualified ratifioation muoh stronger
than I had supposed - a sentiment so strong
as to cause amazement. ll

9 Litera!l Digest, February 14, 1920, 33.
10 Ibid.

-

11

~. ~.,

v. 59,pt .1, 2183.

e
As may well be thought the Significance and value of
this vote was variously estimated.

Each seemed to be able

to interpret the results to his own gain.

In

the Senate

the findings were attaoked bitterly by Senator MoCormick.
In his (Wilson's] appeal to the faoulties
and students of the colleges and universities,
the very elements of our population with
whioh he has been most of his life most
intimately aSSOCiated, and to whioh he was
most confident in his appeal, he was
overwhelmingly defeated and rejeoted.
The intelleotuals are at one with the rest
of the people in opposing the denationalization
of the United states. 12 The figures actually speak for themselves.

It seems

rather apparent that neither Side oould feel oonfident of
a clear out majority.

Actually the figures show that if

the three divisions of ratification in some form are grouped
together 125,855 voted for ratification against 13,933 in
opposition to the Treaty in any form. 13
In 1919 and 1920 it seemed almost the fashion to express
one's opinion on the League question.

Many

of the leaders of

the country reflected their attitude, during this period,
toward the League of Nations in speeches and other modes
of expression.

12

~.

13

!!! York Times, leb. 10, 1920.

9

On March 1, 1919, Josephus Daniels, Secretary of Navy,

in a speech celebrating the drafting of the Peace-League Plan
gave a very lofty interpretation to the League.
Any man in this country who tries
to stir up opposition to the League of
Nations will be guilty of trying to
pave the way for another world deluge
of blood, and will be just as great a
criminal as the ex-Kaiser. This
document makes Magna Carta and the
Declaration of Independenoe mere
forerunners of an immortal instrument
that bleSseSl$ll the world for all
generations. 4

Herbert Hoover, Food Administrator, in an address
at Leland Stanford University on October 3, 1919 gave his
personal view of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
To me every line of the covenant
is the 'complete negation of militarism ••••
Opposition to it there arose entirely
from the representatives of the old
militaristic regimes and from the
reaotionaries of the world in general. lS
Later in October "Teddy" Roosevelt gave a statement to
the press oonoe:rning his opinion of the League.

14 Literary Digest, Maroh 1, 1919, 18.
15

Times, Oot. 4, 1919.

10

The great civilized nations of the
world •••• should combine by Solemn agreement
in this great rgrld league for the peacelof
righteousness.
In the MarCh 22, 1919 issue of the Literary Digest,
attention is oalled to the very serious omission in the
platform of the League of Nations as oabled from Paris.
Nowhere in the platform, nor •••
the proceedings that led up to its
promulgation is to be found any hint of •••
recognition of the faot, generally
accepted by civilized humanity, of the
existence of a Supreme Being ••••
Man proposes but God disposes, and
unless the League of Nations takes into
aocount - not alone in word, but in
spirit.- the fact of God, it is foredoomed to failure, just as every
previous plan and scheme of men to
insure permanent peaoe has broken down
under the pressure of national ambition,
hatred, or avarioe - traits that have
not yet been banished from the world.
there must be something more potent than
bayonets or battle-8hips, neeaful as
both are under present world oonditions,
as the ultimate authority. Back of the
cit izen is the state - using the term in
its broad sense - and back of the state
is, or will be, the League ot Nations.
Back of thi League must be God, if it is
to endure. 7
in

16 Ibid., Oct. 19, 1919.

17 Literary Digest, March 22, 1919, 7.

au

Q .

j

11
A still more cynical view of the League is championed
by J. C. Walsh, staff correspondent of the Oatholic weekly,
America, who writes dubiously of the League, reviewing the
failure of similar dreams since Henry IV and Queen Elizabeth.
He sees also some of the principals at the Peace Oonference
as being:
••• so eagerly intent upon carving
the carcasses of this and that empire as
to be uncertain whether there is any
oonscious concern whatever for mere
humanity; whether the League of Nations
is anything more than a convenient
subject on which to engage conversation
while business of immediate and intimate
importanoe is being dispatched. 18
In a petition sent to the Senate, Dr. Watson, Secretary

of the War Work Commission of the Methodist Episcopal Church
South of Washington, D. C. recommended:
That we urge Senate of United States •••
conSideration of the ••• treaty and
the league of nations ••• with such
reservations as will not in any way
weaken the high purpose s of that
document or make necessary its
withdrawal or its resubmission. 19
In the

Oon~ressional

Record many reflections of opinion

are found in the letters, petitions and telegrams sent to the

18 America, February 15, 1919, 463.
19

Cong.~,

V.59, pt. 1, 413.

11

LiLiiJS
12
Senate.

Instances are found where many colleges sent

statements urging consideration of the League.

One suoh

petition was signed by Rev. Dr. Henry Churchill King, president
of Oberlin College, Ohio and of 118 members of the faculty
favoring the ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany ••
"with such interpretatic reservations as may be proper-and
necessary.n20

Senator Chamberlain of Oregon presented a

statement from Reed College, Portland, Oregon, in reference to
the vote of the faculty on the peace treaty.
We, the undersigned members of the
faculty of Reed College, are convinced of
the supreme importance of the ratification
by the Senate, as soon as pOSSible, of the
treaty of peace with such interpretative
reservations as may be proper and necessary
to protect American interests, but which
recognize the solemn duty of this country
as a world power to assume its fair share
of responsibility for the preservation of
the world peace and justice. We urge the
Senators from Oregon to promote this action.
We believe that a strong majority of the
most intelligent and public-spirited citizens
of all part ies in the state will support
them in favoring a resolution ratifying the
treaty of peace with the League of Nations
covenant in terms that will make it clearly
unnecessary to resubmit t~i treaty to the
general peace conference.

20

!lli., 959.

21

~.,

1070.

··.2! .I ..

!.
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Another petition was signed by Rev. John W. Hofrman, D.D.
president of Ohio Wesleyan University, and 29 members of the
faculty, favoring the League.

A resolution was also

unanimously adopted by the faculty of Toledo
favoring the League.

Universi~y,

Ohio,

A resolution was also unanimously

adopted by the faculty of Toledo University, Ohio, favoring
ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany and the
covenant. 22

At a public meeting held in Pueblo, Qolorado,

January 2, 1920, the following resolutions were adopted:
Whereas it is apparent that a strong
effort is being made by interests not
wholly in accord with Americanism to
force a compromise upon the adoption
of the ••• League of Nations.
Resolved by the citizens of Pueblo,
Oolorado, regardless of party •••• That
we are unalterably opposed to any
compromise in any way changing or
modifying the Senate reservations, and
that the Knox resolutions declaring
peace be adopted. 23
Oreeping into the petitions now was found some evidence
that the people were becoming uneasy of the fact that
technically they were still at war with Germany.

Emphasis

was being laid not so much on the League but on ratification

22
23

-Ibid.,
-Ibid.,

1083
590

14

of the treaty with Germany.

The above quotation shows this

tendency and in the following petition it is also quite
evident.

This statement was presented January 26, 1920,

representing 20,000 California women requesting the Senate
to ratify the treaty of peace with Germany and the covenant
of the League of Nations.

Attention is brought to the

fact that:
••• Armistice day is a year and a
quarter past. Yet the departments
of our Government are not agreed as
to the American relations with her
late enemies and to her allies in war.
Into half a dozen camps they are
divided, questioning the motives of
the treaty, .the practicability of the
covenant, the definition of words, the
contradiction of articles, the spirit
of allies abroad and citizen at home.
Surely the world will be nearer the
milleniwn when war is as hard to make
as peace. 24
Even the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce laid pressure
upon the legislature.

In a telegram dated Deoember 20, 1919,

this organization stated, "We believe that with the exoeption
of an unimportant minority the people of the U. S. desire to
have a league of nations •••• n25 This apparently was not
suffioient, for a month later the board of direotors of the

24

~.,

25

rug.., 1920.

2037.

1

j : i!il.! i.
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Chamber of Commerce of the United states of America sent a
resolution. urging "the President and the Senate to take
prompt aotion with respeot to the treaty of peaoe with
Germany with such reservations as will fully safeguard
every fundamental prinoiple of the Government of the United
States. "26
t

Prom all these statements, resolutions, telegrams and
petitions found in the. Congressional Record it is evident
that oonsiderable pressure was laid upon the legislators for
action.

In an article from the .New
York
.-.
- -.. Sun of January 27,
~

1920 Professor Philip Marshall Brown, professor of International Law at Prinoeton University takes exception to this
coeroion.

He oontinues by stating:
I desire to register a vigorous
protest against the organized moral
coercion now being exerted on the
Senate at a time when it should be
most respeoted in the exercise of one
of its most important funotions,
namely, the treaty-making power. The
pressure whioh has been brought to
bear on the Senate ••• is most
insidious and dangerous •
••• The Senate owes a duty to the
Amerioan people to reserve its judgement
and action in order to safeguard national
interests.
If the real objeot of popular
sentiment is merely the speedy attainment

26 Ibid.,

1972.

lIIIII

it 1

SAUd 1![
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of peace and the olarifioation of
an ambiguous Situation, then let us
restore a legal state of peaoe and
reserve the disoussion of prinoiples
for a time when reason oan assert itsel~
and the people of the U.S. can fully
understand the exaot nature of the
obligations they are asked to assume •••• 27
It is from statements like that and more espeoially
of those similar in tenor to that of Senator Borah t s that
made it oomparatively easy to use the League as the springboard in the oampaign of 1920.
On December 11, 1919 Senator Borah expressed the

. following viewpoint •
• •• I trust sinoerely that it (the
treaty) is dead and that it will stay
dead. It is the best thing the Senate
has done since it has been in session
or for many years, and if it does nothing
else e~cept to kill the treaty it will
be ent it led to the grat i tude of the .
American people for all time to come •
••• The American people have a way of
assuming jurisdiction and retaining
jurisdiction until they render final
judgement and this question has gone
to the jurisdiction of the American
people and it will be definitely and
finally settled by them in the election
of 1920. It does not make any difference
how we vote here in the meant ime or what
proceedings we may have this question is
now in the minds of the masses of the
AmeriO~ people and you can not eliminate
it ••••
27
28

January 27, 1920.
Cong., Reo., V.59, pt.l, 919.
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CHAPTER II
ATTITUDES IN ELECTION YEARS
Peace! Progress! Prosperityll
These vote getting exclamations were the watchwords
of the Democratic Party and sounded the keynote of the
campaign of 1920.
Governor James M. Cox of OhiO, publisher of the Daypon
News, was the choice of the Democratic Party for the
-Presidency
and his running mate was Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

The Republican Party placed

its hopes on Senator Warren G. Harding, also of Ohio and also
a publisher of an . D.h1() paper, the

Marion~.

Striking for

the Vice-Presidency was Governor calvin Coolidge of
lfassachusetts.
The completed platform of the Democratic party commended
the Fresident for his courage and good faith and charged that
the Republican Senate refused to ratify the treaty merely
because it was the product of Democratic statesmanship.2

1 The Democratic Text Book - 1~~0, issued by The
Democratic-rational Comm~e~20,
•
2

~.,

8.

17
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fhe League plank declared:
The Democratic Party favors The
League of Nations as the surest, if not
the only, practical means of maintaining
the peace of the world and terminating
the insufferable burden of great military
and naval establishments.3
The Republican Party did not come out as boldly for
the League of Nations as did the Democratic Party.

In its

platform of 1920 the Republicans maintained:
The Republican party stands for
agreement among the nations to preserve
the peace of the world. We believe that
such an international association must
be based upon international justice, and
must provide methods which shall maintain
the rule of public right by the development
of law and the decision of impartial courts,
and which shall secure instant and general
international conference whene~er peace
shall be threatened by political action,
so that the nations pledged to do and
inSist upon what is just and fair may
exercise their influence and power for
the prevention of war.4
Thus, the usual aim of the platform-makers to carve
a plank for a controversial question upon which all could
stand was achieved in a remarkable degree.

The first

paragraph rea4 well to those who wanted the League.

It

promised at the very least a consultative part with nations

3 llli,., 10.
4 Republican Text

~

- 1920, 6.

:a :

J"

; a

dad

2.
.1.9

whereby "instant and

~neral

conference" should be had

whenever the peace was threatened.

The se cond paragraph

denounced the covenant in words grave enough to suit any
bitter opponent of the League as "oertain" to produce "the
injustice, hostility, and oontroversy among nations whioh
it proposed to prevent".5
To prove this further,.that the Republioans did not
try to urge the League referendum on the voters as did
the Demoorats, it is only neoessary to consult the utteranoes
of Harding.

The following exoerpt, found in an address by

Harding, shows the oharacteristio tendency, as the campaign
wears on, for the Republicans to underplay the League and
to stress other policies of the platform.
It will avail nothing to disouss
in detail the league covenant, which
was oonceived for world super-government,
negotiated in misunderstanding, and
intolerantly urged and demanded by its
administration sponsors, who resisted
every effort to safeguard Amerioa and
who finally rejeoted when such
safeguards were inserted. 6

5 Ibid., 7.
6 Ibid., 26.

.20

Harding in his acceptance speech at Marion, Ohio, July
23, 1920, attempted to clarify the Republican attitude.,
toward the League from the time it entered the Senate until
this campaign.
We Republicans of the Senate •••
when we saw the structure of a world
super-government taking visionary form,
joined in a becoming warning of our
devot ion to this republic. If the
torch of constitutionalism had not been
dimmed, the delayed peace of the world
and the tragedy of disappointment and
Europe's misunderstanding of America
easily might have been avoided. The
Republicans of the Senate halted the
barter of independent American eminence
and influence which it proposed to
exchange for an obscure and unequal
place in the merged government of the
world. Our party means to hold the
heritage of American nationality
unimpaired and unsurrendered. It is
better to be the free and disinterested
agent of international justice and
advancing civilization, with the
covenant of conscience, then be
shackled by a written compact Which
surrenders our freedom of action and
gives to a military alliance the right
to proclaim Americats duty to the world.
No surrender of rights to a world
councilor its military alliance, no
assumed mandatory, however appealing,
ever shall summon the sons of this
republic to war. Their supreme
sacrifice shall only be asked for
America and its call of honor, there
is sanctity in the right we will not
delegate. 7

7

~.,

26-29.

p

;
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Thus construing the purpose of the covenant and brushing
the League aside, he proceeded to say that the way was "very
simple tl • 8 Explaining how simple it was, he continued:
With a Senate advising as the
constitution contemplates, I would
hopefully approach the nations of
Europe and of the earth, proposing
that understanding which makes us
a willing participant in the
consecration of the nations to a
new leadership •••• 9
The first move of the candidates of the Democratic
Party was to force the League of Nat ions to the front as the
leading campaign issue.

This mode of procedure on the League

issue was brought out clearly after a conference between the
Democratic nominees at Columbus, even as early as July 1920.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic Vice-Presidential
candidate told the newspaper men that the League of Nations
was to be the "big outstanding issue of the campaign".lO
Later in July we again find the Vice-Presidential
candidate stating the attitude of his party toward the League
and also the attitude of the Republican party seen through the
eyes of a Democrat.

e -Ibid.
9
10

Ibid., 45.

22
The Democratic party enters the
campaign with the clear cut purpose of
proving that the world war has not been
fought in vain. Senator Harding says,
"Should the Democrats win, the treaty and
the league will be rat If ied. " He is right.
No one, probably not even Senator Harding
himself, knows what would happen should
the Republicans win. • •• one branch of
his supporters, such as Senator Hiram
Johnson, assures the nation that a
Republican victory means no League of
Nations. Another branch, led by such
men as former President Taft, assures
the nation that a Republican victory
means the acceptance of the League With
certain undefined reservations ••••
One of the prominent issues is thus
be coming early and clearly drawn. A
Democratic victory means ratification of
the Treaty and the League of Nations, which,
as the world knows, is already constituted.
A Republican victory means that the United
states with RuSSia, Mexico, and Turkey
shall remain outside. The election of
Cox means that the United states, in
particular with the other civilized
nations of the world, Will, through the
League of Nations solve international
difficulties and 'prevent a recurrence of
the holocaust of 1914-1918. 1
We find the Democratic candidates much more articulate
in reference to the League of Nations.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

is especially more vociferious than Calvan Coolidge, the
Republican Vice-Presidential candidate, for in his acceptance

11

Literary Digest, July 20, 1920, 9.
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speeoh at Hyde Park, New York, August 9, 1920, we find
Mr. Roosevelt again dealing almost wholly with the League.
The League of Nations is a
practical solution of a praotical
situation. It is no more perfect
than our original constitution ••••
was perfect. It is not anti-national,
it is anti-war. No super-nation,
binding us to the decision of its
tribunals, is suggested, but the
method and maohinery by which the
opinion of oivilization may beoome
effective against those who seek
war is at last within the reaoh of
humanity •••• 12
Seldom do we find a Presidential candidate stating as
forcibly the marked oleavage between the two parties.

At

Tulsa, Oaklahoma, on Ootober 1, Governor Cox said, "Now he
(Harding] is against the League I am for it. "13

And again

at Nashville, Tennessee, we find Cox stating, "We will aocept
any reservations that help to olarify.

We will aooept any

reservations that help to strengthen. ,,14
As the oampaign wore on and With more and more pressure
and bitter words being laid on both Sides, Senator Harding,
at Marion, OhiO, Ootober 11, 1920, oame out with a olear

33.
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statement of his position.

"I am in favor of a world

association - call it what you will, the name is of slight
consequence - that will discourage or tend to prevent war."15
Again in October the ooncentration of forces made necessary a
summation of his attitudes.

In his important Des Moines

speeoh, Harding oame out forcibly against the obligations of
the League, and he too, made quite evident the difference of
policy between the two parties, and the plan he would follow
when elected - an assooiation of nations, rather than the
League of Nations.
I do not want to clarify these
obligations; I want to turn my baok
on them. It is not interpretation but
rejection I am seeking.
The Demooratic oandidate in his
speeoh of acceptance has said, "A
definite plan has been agreed upon.
The League of Nations is in operation.
Senator Harding as the Republican
candidate for the Presidency, proposes
in plain words that we remain out of it.
As the Democratic candidate I favor
gOing in."
.
The issue, therefore, is olear,
I understand the position of the
Demooratio candidate, and he understands
mine •••• As soon as possible after my
election, I shall advise with the best
minds in the United States, and
"espeoially I shall consult in advance
with the Senate ••• to the end that we
shall have an assooiation of nations
for thi6promotion of international
peaoe.
15
16
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In an appeal to Republicans and Independents who favor
the League, Chairman White of the Democratic National
Committee said, in commenting on thiS

concret~

statement of

Harding's favoring an association that,
Senator Harding has tried to
revive his "Bush-League", his
association of nations that will not
associate. All sensible people know
that the forty nations now composing
the major League, the League of Nations,
will not abandon it at Mr Hardings
behest, and that if he were to form
his separate association after his
separate German peace it would have
to be composed of Mexico, Bolshevik
Russia, Germany, Austria, Turkey and
United states.
The only definite thing he has
ever said was in his Des Moines speech.
That statement made a square issue and
rendered it certain that the only hope
to secure our adherence to the League
of Nations or any other modification of
i t is through the election of Governor
Cox. 17
.
Democrats attached great significance to the repudiation
of Harding on the League issue by Herbert Parsons, a former
Republican National Committeeman, and an active New York
Republican.

In a letter resigning his membership in the

New York County Republican Committee, he announced his
intention to vote for Cox because:

17 Literary Digest, October 2;, 1920, 13.
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The issue to the American voter is
between gOing into the League with
reservations and not going into it
at all. Harding is and will be for
not going into it at all. The only
likelihood that the United States will
under Harding, enter the League is
that he will find it impossible to
erect an association of nations or a
new league and so will have to orawl
. into this one .18
As the League had many opponents so too did it have
proponents and among them oan be oounted the American
Federation of Labor.

In 1920 this organization with a

membership of four million did not oome out officially for
any candidate but practically endorsed the Democratic
platform.

Samuel Gompers, president of the A. F. of L

believed the Democratic platform more nearly in accord with
the Federation's "declaration of human rights" than the
Republican platform.

The Non-Part1sian Political Campaign

Committee after investigating the past attitudes of the two
principal candidates toward labor legislation reported the
"reoord of Governor Cox uniformly favorable to labor and
that of Senator Harding sometimes favorable and sometimes
unfavorable."19

18

Democratic~,

85.

19 Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of ~ and Labor,
E. P. Dutton and Company, New York, 1925, II, 323.
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Why, if it appears that there

~ere

So many supporter$

of the League, did not the Democratic candidates win the
election?

Was Wilson given his solemn referendum as the

following article stated he would?

"Mr. Wilson is to be

granted his solemn referendum ••• and the issue at this
election is whether we are going into the Wilson Covenant
or staying out."20

Being faced with the prospects the !!!

York Times believed would occur, one may wonder why the
-Democrats
did not win. The Times stated: "The men and
women of the country on November 2, will vote for peace or
war, for safeguarded and enduring peace, or for certain and
frequent wars."2l
In analyzing the election results we find that Harding's
victory showed the largest shift of voting strength between
the two parties which ever occurred in four years.22

At

first glance this does appear as a repudiation but upon
further study we are less certain that such is the case.
Is it correct to hail this overwhelming victory solely as
a repudiation of the League?

In attempting to answer this

question we are led not to the answer directly but to more
questioning.

20
21
22
Un ivers

Could it have been desire for a change, hatred

Editorial in Chicago Daily Tribune, October 23, 1920
Editorial in New York Times, October 29, 1920.
Edgar E. Robinson, The Presidential~, Stanford
Press Stanford California
21

28

of Wilson, di,sapproval of the League of Nations, disapproval
of some other features of the Treaty of

Ver~ailles,

the

effect of the women's vote or of prohibition, of the large
Republican campaign chest and the large and powerful
Republican press1

In posing these questions we reveal the

number of issues present in any thorough explanation of
this supposed mandate against the League in the election
of 1920.
Irving Fisher, Professor of Political Economy at Yale
University, in an analysis of the election, stated that the
dominant factors were two:
The natural reaction against the
party in power, which inevitably
accumulates enemies in proportion to
its length of office holding its
activities and agressiveness and the
historical untoward accidents for
which the party in power is always
held responsible by unthinking
masses of men. 2 3
Certainly there was a desire for change.

There was a general

disgruntlement among the people because of the numerous
discomforts which the country had suffered during the last
four years including especially the high cost of living.
The people evidently wanted to try their luck with another
party to see if that would bring relief in some way.

23

Times, March 6, 1921.
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It is interesting to observe that the high cost of
living, besides being a thorn in the flesh, gave an acoidental
lift to the Republioans.
campaign fund.

It was one reason for their large

When the profits were rising as they did

during the years immediately preoeding the eleotion, the
prooess oreates profits to business men, and the Republican
Party had a greater oonstituenoy among business men than the
Democratio Party.
However large the number of Republioan advooates of
the League who were held in line by the Harding promises to
remodel the League of Nations or provide an effeotive
substitute - and they must have made a great army - there
can be no doubt of the torrent of anti-Wilson support that
flowed into the Harding headquarters.
Many

camp.

different racial extraotions deserted the Wilson

Some of the Italian-Americans were disgruntle.d over

Fiume.

Some of the Irish-Americans were angry because

Irish freedom had not been provided for and because England
was supposed to have six votes in the League.

The German-

Americans and the Austrian-Americans hated the reparation
features of the Versailles Treaty.24

24

Ibid.
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The editor of an Italian daily newspaper called on
Harding to assure him that, "The Fiume question had made all
Americans of Italian extraction Republicans. n25

George Viere

nationally known leader of organized German-American
sentiment promised to deliver the votes of that huge group
to Harding.

Governor Oox, he admitted, might be an estimable

gentleman, but Viereck added:
we care.

"We do not know; neither do

As long as he is a supporter of the Wilson policies

we are determined to defeat him.

We have deCided that there

must not be another Democratic President for a generation. tt26
Fisher claims that it was the foreign-born defection which
hurt the Democratic Party most.

He analyzes the results and

comparison with the previouseleotion finds:
•.• that the shift of votes in the
States with a large element of
Germans, Austrians, Italians and
Irish is large and the shift in
the States where such elements were
small is small. The larger the
foreign-born element in any State,
the more votes gained by the
Republican Party •
• • •the natural react ion will •••
account for about half\ of the
landslide. The mere return of

25

26

Ibid.,
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the Republiean votes lost in
1916 would aeoount for 40 per
cent. It is significant that,
in oomparing the different
states, we find in general the
larger the left shift in 1916
the l~rger the right shift in
1920. "(
Many other Americans were equally willing to dispose
of Wilson and his administration.

The aots of the government

during the war were inevitably an issue in the election, and
a legion of minor irritations inoident to it clamored for
expression.

Necessarily, too the personality of the man

who led the nation's mighty war effort could not be kept out
of oonsideration even though he was now retiring as an
invalid.

But aside from occasional references to Wilson's

condition there seems to have been no effort to mitigate
th8 storm that beat around him.
fanned as the campaign proceeded.

On the contrary it was
When Governor Coolidge,

in an address toward the close of the oampaign, expressed
sympathy for Wilson and hope of his recovery, the !!!York
Times considered it so notable that it asked who else had
done likewise and added:
When the President was first
stricken down a year ago, and during
the weeks when he hung between life
and death, not a word, not a whisper
of ooncern or condolence came from
the Republioan Congress and since
then the attitude of his opponents
27

Ibid., Maroh 6
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has been one of thinly concealed
gloating over his breakdown.
Never have they made a
magnanimous gesture toward
his sickroom. 28
When the votes were tabulated it was quite evident.
that Cox was at the bottom of the landslide, for 16,152,220
votes were cast for Harding to 9,471,553 for Cox.

Harding

bad sucoeeded in winning 60.35 percent of the total vote,
the largest pe·rcentage of the total vote since 1896.

The

Democratio portion was 34.13 per cent and in no section
did its voting share sink below 24 per cent.

The Republicans

carried every state of the North and West, all the border
states except Kentucky and Tennessee. 29
The total vote showed an increase of eight million
over the previous presidential election.

The Democratic

vote was almost exactly the vote of 1916, but the Republican
vote nearly doubled, as did the "other" vote.

The nineteenth

amendmenil had been proclaimed in August 1920,_ anq; thereby
women were entitled to vote in every state.

The effect of

women suffrage and the prohibition question on the election

28
29
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is more difficult to determine than some of the other issues.
The fact that women were given the franchise makes the proper
comparison of returns tor 1916 and 1920 imPossible. 30
True it is that the returns did give Harding the
over-whelming victory over Cox a triumph which many
interpreted as a smashing repudiation of the "Wilson League",
but even Calvin Coolidge, the newly elected Vice-President
denied any such result and said soon atter the election, "I
doubt if any particular mandate was given in the last election
on the question of the League ot Nations •••• "3l
So in the light ot all this evidence it seemS only
fair to believe that the country went to the polls in
November and voted not against the League ot Nations as the
sole issue of repudiation but against every one ot these
factors tor each one of them counted to Some extent, but no
one of them had a monopoly.
Just as the personality of Wilson dominated the war
era, so did those of his successors set the pace of the
period of normalcy.

30

~.

31

Times, November 23, 1920.

4 4 £

qe ,

S 1$lliiQ.!It

34
As in 1920 so in 1924 the candidates were new in a
presidential campaign.

But whereas Cox and Harding had been

in no real sense presidential candidates prior to their

nominations, Calvin Coolidge had held the presidency since
hiS accession upon the death of Harding in 1923, and Robert
LaFollette, who appeared as an independent candidate in
thiS campaign, had been an active contender for the
Republican presidential nominations in several Republican
conventions, notably in 1908 and in 1912.

John W. Davis was

a newcomer to the presidential race, as would have been the
chief contenders for the Democratic nominations, William G.
Mc Adoo and Alfred E. Smith.
In its platform adopted at Cleveland on June 12, 1924
the Republican Party declared strongly against the League.
Their plank on foreign policy contained this statement:
The Republican Party maintains the
traditional American policy of noninterference in the political affairs
of other nat ions. This Government has
definitely refused membership in the
League of Nations and to assume any
obligations under the covenant of the
League. On this we stand. ,,2
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While the Republicans apparently were united in their
"hands off" policy toward the League, the Demoorats found
the League question ample ground for biokering.
Democratio

P~y

The

in its platform adopted at Madison Square

Garden in July 1924 stated:
It is of supreme importance to
oivilization and to mankind that
America be placed and kept on the
right side of the greatest moral
question of all time, and therefore,
the Democratic Party renews its
declaration of confidence in the
ideal of world peace, the League of
Nat ions and the World Court of
Justice, as together constituting
the supreme effort of the statesmanship and religious oonviction of
our time to organize the world for
peace .33
This too seemed like a Simple statement of fact and
future policy.

But another plank was added at the convention

to the Democratic Platform which caused great discord.

This

plank reaffirmed that "there is no substitute for the League
of Nations", and urged:
••• that the question of joining
the. League be taken out of party
politics by submitting it to the
American people at a referendum
election, advisory to the Government, to be held offically under

33
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act of Congress, tree from all
other questions and candidacies,
after ample time for full
consideration and discu§sion
throughout the country.,4
On

the floor of the Democratic Convention itself

Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War in the Wilson Cabinet,
warned the delegates that if they voted this referendum
plank in place of one frankly advocating American membership
in the League of Nations, they would be "repudiating Woodrow
Wilson and substituting in the Democratic Party the leadership
of Henry Cabot Lodge". 35
This was strong language.

Even the mention of the

name of Henry Cabot Lodge at a Democratic Convention should
have been cause enough for trouble.

But when the vote was

taken it was 351i for Newton D. Baker's plan to 743! for the
referendum plank.

This dissension in party ranks helped none

but the opponents.
While the Democrats were bickering among themselves
they of course did not forget to cast slurs at the Republicana
They claimed that "The Republican administration has no
foreign policy", and that it bad drifted without plan.

34
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They had a remedy :for this in what they called "a sound and
positive :foreign policy" but a more ambiguous group o:f
statements would be di:f:ficult to :find.

The Democratio

party maintained:
This great nation cannot af:ford
to play a minor role in world
politics. It must have a sound
and positive :foreign polioy, not
a negative one. We declare :for
a oonstructive :foreign polioy based
on these prinoiples:.
(a) Outlawry o:f war and an abhorrence
o:f militarism, conquest and
imperialism.
(b) Freedom :from entangling political
allianoes with :foreign nations •
•••• (g) Full, :free and open oooperation
with all other nations :for the
promotion o:f peace and justioe
throughout the world.
(h) In our :foreign relations, this
country should stand as a unit,
and to be success:ful, :foreign
policies must have the approval
36
and support o:f the American people.
Evidently the Republicans were to stand on their record
and so in the preamble to the party plat:form we :find this
statement:

36 Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, The 1924
Campaign - ~ Analysis, Richard R. Smith, New-VOrx;-I927,
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The Republican Party in national
convention assembled presents to
the people of the Nation this
platform of its principles, based
on a record of its accomplishments,
and asks and awaits a new vote of
confidence. We reaffirm our
devotion to the Constitution of
the United States and the principles
and institutions of the American
system of representative government.37
Of course it is indeterminable how many people ever
read this platform and it is also doubtful how many would
after having read it voted to reelect the Republicans on the
basis of accomplishments.

It has been said by many that the

Coolidge landslide of 1924 was a personal victory and that
the Republican Party did not win the election but the
personality of Coolidge did. 38

Not that he was such an

outstanding personality but the people were won over by his
"calm, judicial ways", and his "simple homely virtues".39
This was a clear-cut statement of policy and it appeared as
though in this election there was to be no doubt or
straddling of the League plank.

In fact there was hardly a

League plank that could be considered as such.

38 Hugh L.

Though the

37 Ibid., 129.
Keenleyside, "The American Political
Revolution of 1924", Current History, V. 21, March 1925, 25.
39 Literary Digest, July 12, 1924, 7.
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Republioans oame out firmly against the United States joining
tbe League still

~hey

were not against oooperating with the

League in some of its endeavors.

Their platform provided

for just this.
In aooordanoe, however, with
with the long-established Amerioan
praotioe of giving aid and assistance
to other peoples, we have most usefully
assisted by oooperation in the
humanitarian and teohnioal works undertaken by the i-eague, without involving
ourselves in European golitios by
acoepting membership.4
In this platform we also find a rather slight reference of
endorsement of the World Court •
•••• the Republican Party pledges
itself to aid and assist in the
perfeotion of prinoiples of
international law and the
settlement of international
disputes. 4l
When the caapaign is reviewed we find that in the July
Convention the Democrats lost their real

opport~ity.

In the

animosities and biokering in this oonvention we find the
party disunited and divided.

Though John W. Davis was

intelleotually one of the most eminent oandidates who ever

40 .!EJ4.
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aspired to the White House he was unable to unite and
revitalize a disorganized and faction-rent Democratic Party.
This is reflected in bold contrast to the Republican campaign
which was excellently managed both politically and
financially.
Actually the League was not considered a real issue in
this election.

The Republicans, as we bave seen absolutely

refused any relation to the League and the Democrats were
divided and disunited on their League policy.

Some held

t

Wilson and his poli·oies in such high regard that it amounted
to almost religious fervor and to alter their policy toward
the League would, to them, mean total repudiation of Wilson
and all for which he stood.

Others in the Democratic Party

evaded the League as a party issue and declined to carry
the League as a dominant policy.42
Many cartoons depicted the Democratic Party evading the
League question and refusing to carry the "millstone of the
League" through the campaign. 43
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Thus we find the campaign that ended in the re-election
of Calvin Coolidge was remarkable in no way except for the
existence of a third party which made a substantial showing.
Coolidge received ••••••• 15,729,060
Davis received ••••••••• 8,391,431
La Follette received ••• 4,820,758
Scattered vote of ••••••
164,634
Total vote cast •••.••.• 29,105,883

44

The number of eligible voters was 56,925,000, which
showed that 51.1% of the eligible voters cast their ballots.
This total was raised by the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment which extended the franchise to more than
25,000,000 politically inexperienced women. 45
Politically the scene was very much as usual.

There

was a comparative lack of well-defined issues and a general
apathy and detachment on the part of a large percentage of
citizens was evident.

Prosperity, Prohibition, and

Prejudice, -these three were the real issues of the campaign
of 1928 and in reading the campaign literature of the day we
see that foreign policy was curiously inert as an issue.

44
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The candidates nominated in the Democratic convention
held in Houston, Texas were Alfred E. Smith, and 'Joseph T.
Robinson.

The Republicans were pinning their hopes on Herbert

Clark Hoover; and Charles E. Curtis.

Both of the presidential

candidates had been widely known as potential candidates long
before the campaign of 1928 opened, and both were generally
regarded as possessing outstanding leadership.
Four years previously Al Smtth had been hailed as the
eighth wonder of the world becauseof his tremendous victory
in the gubernatorial election in New York State.

He was

elected by a majority of 115,000 votes and in that election
of 1924 was the only Democrat elected in the state.

He also

held the distinction of being the only governor to be elected
to Albany for three terms in nearly a century.46
Hoover's accomplishments were many.

He was Belgian

Relief Commissioner, Food Administrator, and Secretary of
Commerce under President Harding and the Republicans exalted
themselves by declaiming upon his greater fitness, by
training, travel and temperament for the administration of
world affairs. 47
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Seldom has this been the oase of both contenders in a
presidential eleotion.
of a great vote.

This in itself led to the expectation

However, eaoh candidate faoed serious

discontent within his party and neither oandidate had the
wholehearted support of the party organization.
No mention is made of the League of Nations in either
the Demooratio or the Republioan Party Platform.

The

Democratio Platform as adopted on June 29, 1928, showed that
the party still revered Wilson and his ideals as evidenced
in this exoerpt:
We the Demooratio Party in
oonvention assembled, pause to pay
our tribute of love and respeot to
the memory of him who in his life and
in his offioial aotions voioed the
hopes and aspirations of all good men
and women of every raoe and olime,
the former President of the United
States, Woodrow Wilson. His spirit
moves on and his example and deeds
will exalt those who oome after us
as they have inspired us.
We are grateful that we were
privileged to work with him and again
pay tribute to his high ideals and
aooomplishments. 48
Nothing tangible was made of the League as a oampaign
issue rather the people were more oonoerned with issues suoh

~
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as the following:
We hold that government must
funotion not to oentralize our wealth
but to preserve equal opportunity so
that all may share in our prioeless
resouroes, and not oonfine prosperity
to a favored few. We, therefore, pledge
the Demooratic Party to enoourge
business, sma·ll and great alike; to
conserve human happiness and liberty;
to break the shaokles of monoply and
free the business of the nation; to
respond to popular Will.4~
On eleotion day, November 6, 1928, Herbert Hoover

oarried forty states inoluding four states of the "solid
South".

Governor Smith's popular vote of 15,005,497 to

21,429,109 for Hoover showed that he was stronger than
either Davis in 1924 or Cox in 1920. 50

Still, Smith lost

his own state, where for the first time he ran behind his
tioket, which inoluded the viotorious Democratic candidate for
governor and United States senator, respectively, Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Dr. Royal S. Copeland.
In the oampaigns of 1932 and 1936 the League of Nations
ceased to be an issue.

The Amerioan people were concerned

more with domestic issues than with international policies.
Two rather formidable problems oonfronted the presidential
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aspirants they were, prohibition and the depression.
In the 1932 campaign we find both parties, Democratic
as well as Republican, paying "verbal homage to certain
phases of internationalism", but not including the League
of Nations in these utterances.

Both parties asked that

the United States join the World Court and both favored
consultation with other governments in case of threatened
violation of the anti-war pact.

While the Democrats did

not even mention the League, the Republican platform did
take satisfaction in the fact that during the Sino-Japanese
dispute the United States did act in harmony with the
government represented in the League of Nations.
This is the only mention of the League, as such, to be
found in either platform. 5l There was slight divergence of
policies between the party platforms and really the great
difference between the two platforms, apart from the
contrast on prohibition related to their divergenoe on
economic problems.

In fact, many claimed that the parties

were so in accord in this campaign that, It • • • essent ially the
issue is a choice between a conservative and a progressive
standard-bearer. 1t52

51 Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, The 1932
Campaign-An Analysis, Farrar and Rinehart, Ino. , lreWYork,
1935, 136.

46

Roosevelt was the more 'progressive of the major
candidates.
8S

He, even during the oampaign, was looked upon

a man of action.

From the day of his nomination at

Ohicago he showed his tradition-shattering teohnique.

For

it was the first time in our history that a presidential
candidate flew to the convention to aooept the nomination
of his party and to deliver his own acceptanoe speech. 53
Early in the campaign Governor Roosevelt set the pace
of the oampaign and presented the issues.

By declaring,

"Your oandidate wants repeal ••• from this date on the
Eighteenth Amendment is doomed," he stated flatly his po1ioy
on prohibition. 54
In Roosevelt's op.inion, because of the existing

oonditions, the depression was to take first p1aoe.
deo1ared:
••• it is inevitable that the main
issue of this oampi ign should
revolve about the olear faot of our
economio oondition, a depression so
deep, that it is without precedent
in modern history.55
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Again at Salem, Massachusetts Governor Roosevelt
proved that the depression was the dominant issue in the
campaign.

In addressing the Democrats in the Boston Arena

he said:
I Wish I could stay to see the
burning of the Witch of depression,
but that is impossible. The witch
of depres~ion will be buried ten
feet puder ground after March 4,
next.'o
The whole atmosphere of the campaign showed that the
depression not the League was upper most in the minds of the
people.

Banners, speeches, parades, are evidence of this.

In Boston a banner proclaimed:

"Let's Greet 1933 With

Roosevelt and Prosperity", another declared "12,000,000
Unemployed Want Jobs."57
At this time Roosevelt seemed to b e the answer to what
the people wanted - a leader to take them out of the depths
of the depression.

The election results are evidence of this,

and are almost exactly the reverse of the election of 1928.
Roosevelt obtained 22,815,539 votes to Hoover's 15,759,930
a plurality of 7,055,609 for Roosevelt.58
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At the beginning of his inauguration speech Mr.
Roosevelt stressed the need of leadership and briefly
characterized the distressed conditions of the country but
again no mention was made of the League. 59

In this

inauguration speech the President did give hope and did relie
to some extent, the distraught nation by proclaiming in that
noW famous utterance, " ••• the only thing we have to fear is
fear itself. "60
At the Democratic and Republican conventions in the
summer of 1936 we find slight mention of the League and this
in opposition.

The Republicans, in their platform were at

least rather consistent

in their opposition for they

maintained in the plank on foreign affairs that:
America shall not become a member
of the League of Nations nor of the
World Court nor shall America take
on any entanglin§la11iances in
foreign affairs.
The keynote of President Roosevelt's acceptance speech
was the continuation of the New Deal.

The Democrats in this

convention, in Philadelphia, went on record to:
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Extend the poliCY of the good
ne ighbor. . •• Guard against be ing
drawn, by political commitments,
international banking6~r private
trading into any war.
The foreign policy formulated at this convention contained
not a word concerning the League.

It proposed:

••• no interference with the affairs
of other nations •••• We seek only by
force of our own example to spread
the gospel of peace in the world •••.
Our closest neighbors are good
neighbors. If there are remoter
nations that wish us not good but
ill, they know th~t we can and will
defend ourselves. ,

62
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CHAPTER III
EFFORTS TO INDUCE NATION TO JOIN WORLD COURT
A Permanent Court of
International Justice is hereby
established, in accordance with
Article 14 of the Covenant of
the League of Nations. l
By this statute prospects opened which permitted the
future of the Permanent Court of the Int-ernational Justice
to be acted upon officially by the United states.
It was hoped that -consideration in the United states of
this World Court would be deliberated upon without regard
to some of the preoccupations that beclouded United States
membership in the League of Nations.

As we are to observe,

this was not possible for the alignments resulting from the
disagreements over the League were still evident and active.
On February 17, 1923 Secretary of state Hughes sent a

letter to President Harding recommending that the Senate be
aSked for advice on, and oonsent to, the United States'
adhesion to the Protocol of December 16, 1920.

President

1 "Statute for the Permanent Court of International
Justice", The United States ~ ~ Permanent Court ~
International Justice, United States Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1930, 19.
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Harding acted accordingly and sent the letter and a message
to the Senate on February 24, 1923.
In his message the President cited the fact that a
court was functioning at The Hague in Which the United States
was able to bring suit, but he considered that not enough for
a nation which had long been committed to the peaceful
settlement of international controversies.

He asked the

Senate for approval of adhesion to the protocol, because by
Hughes reservations we could remain free from any legal
relation or assumption of obligation under the Covenant of the
League of Nations.

He believed that these conditions would

be acceptable to the great nations, although nothing could be
done until the United states offered to adhere to these
reservations.

The executive had no authority to make this

offer until the Senate gave its approval and he therefore
urged their "favorable advice and consent".2
In his letter dated February 17, 1923, which accompanied

the President's message, Secretary Hughes, before stating
his present plans, reviewed the active part which the United
states had taken in judicial settlement of international
disputes.

2

He stated:

Cong. Rec., v.64, pt.5, 4498.
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Prior to the First Peace
Conference at the Hague in
1899 the United States had
participated in fifty-seven
arbitrations •••• The President •••
in the past, had acted as
arbitrator between other
nations in five cases;
ministers of the United States,
or others chosen by the United
States, had acted as arbitrators
or umpires in seven cases.'
In recalling the part the United States had, in former
times, played as a peacemaker or at an attempt at being a
peaoemaker the Secretary referred to the instructions
Secretary Hay had given the delegates to the First Peaoe
Conference.

Seoretary Hay instruoted:
Nothing oan seoure for human
government and for the authority of
law whioh it represents so deep a
respeot and so firm a loyalty as the
speotacle of sovereign and independent
States whose duty it is to presoribe
the rules of justice and impose
penalties upon the lawless, bowing
with reference before august
supremaoy of those principles of
right whioh give th~ law its
eternal foundation. 4

A

plan for a permanent international tribunal aocompanie

these instruotions.

It was at this oonference that the

Permanent Court of International Justice was established.

3

Ibid.

4
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However this organization while called "a permanent court
really consisted of an eligible list of persons designated by
the contracting parties" from which tribunals might be
constituted. 5

Secretary Hughes proceeded to reassure the

President that this was not a new or unpopular problem.
He asserted:
••• that the preponderant opinion in
this country has not only favored the
policy of judicial settlement of
,just.icia'ble internat ional disputes
through arbitral tribunals specially
established, but it has also strongly
desired that a Permanent Court of
International Justice Shoulg be
established and maintained.
Referring to the last phase of the Court's growth
Hughes mentioned the relation the League of Nations had to
the present proposed plan.
The covenant of the League of
Nations provided, in article 14, that
the council of the league should
formulate and submit to the members of
the league plans for the establishment
of a Permanent Court of International
Justice Which should be competent to
hear and determine any dispute of an
international character which the
parties thereto should submit to it
and which might also give an advisory

5
6

-Ibid.
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opinion upon any dispute or
question referred to it by the
councilor by the assembly of the
League. This provision of the
covenant, it may be said, entered
into the subsequent controversy with
respect to participation by this
Government in the League of Nat ions;
on the contrary it is believed that
this controversy reflected but little,
if any, divergence of view in this
country in respect to the advisability
of establishing a permanent court of
international justice.·r
In the folloWing words the Secretary of state determined
to show the distinction that the Permanent Court was not
made effective by the Assembly of the League but rather by
a separate protocol.

He no doubt realized that any connection

whatsoever with the League would be oonsidered detrimental to
the Court and wanted to emphasize this distinction.
The council of the league
appointed an advisory committee of
jurists •••• It recommended a plan •••
and after -certain amendments had
been made, the statute constituting
the Permanent Court of International
Justice was adopted by the assembly
of the league on December 13, 1920.
Though these steps were taken
under the auspices of the league the
statute constituting the Permanent
Court of International Justice did

7

Ibid.
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not become effective upon its
adoption by the assembly of the
league. On the contrary, it
became effective by virtue of
the signature and ratification
by the signatory powers of a
special protocol. The reason
for this procedure was that
although the plan of the court
was prepared under article 14
of the covenant, the statute
went beyond the terms of the
court, especially in making the
court available to States which
were not members of the League
of Nations. Accordingly a
protocol of signature was prepared
by which the Signatory powers
declared their acceptance of the
adjoined statute of the PermaneHt
Court of International Justice.
In

ord~r

to presage any unsurmontable difficulty, if

the relation of the Court to the League should prove a
stumbling block in so far as involving the United States in
any legal obligation under the Covenant of the League of

Nations,

Hughes advised that if this presented any question

that this point should be distinctly referred to as a part
of the terms of adhesion on the part of the United States.
He recommended to the President that if this plan as
outlined should meet with his approval he advised the

8

-Ibid.

president to request the Senate to take suitable action
toward the adhesion of the United States to the protocol of
December 16, 1920 accepting the adjoined statute of the
permanent Court of Justice and rejecting the optional clause
for compulsory jurisdiction.
Secretary Hughes also recommended that the terms should
be based upon the following conditions which were to be made
a part of the instrument of adhesion.

He set forth his four

reservations in these words which in the succeeding debates
over the question of adhesion were to become famous and
referred to as the "Hughes reservations".
I.

II

That such adhesion shall not
be taken to involve any relation
on the part of the United states
to the League of Nations or the
assumption of any obligation by
the United States under the covenant
of the League of Nations constituting
Part I of the Treaty of Versailles.
That the United States shall be
permitted to participate through
representatives deSignated for
the purpose and upon an equality
with the other States members
respectively of the council and
assembly of the League of Nations
in any and all proceedings of
either the councilor the assembly
for the election of judges or
deputy judges of the Permanent
Court of International Justice or
for the filling of vacancies.
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III

That the United states will pay
a fair share of the expenses of
the Court as det ermined and
appropriated from time to time.

IV

That the statute of Pennanent
Court of International Justice
adjoined to the protocol shall
not be amended without the
consent of the United State s • 9

Since this message of the President to the Senate on
February 24, 1923 pertained to a treaty or protocol with
foreign governments, it was read behind closed
Hughes' letter was not read.

doors~

According to one report there

were few Senators present as the business of the day was
practically over.

Upon a motion of Senator Lodge, the

message and accompanying letter of Secretary Hughes were
referred to the Committee on Poreign Relations. 10
On February 27 , . this Senate Committee adopted a

resolution offered by Senator Borah calling on Harding for
further infonnation about his proposal.

It was generally

understood that this procedure was a move for delay intended
to give the committee an excuse for not passing on the
World Court question during that session. ll

9

Ibid.

10 "President Harding's Plea for the World Court",
Current History, The New York Times Co., N.Y., v. 18, 39.
11
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On

the previous day, Senator King of Utah, introduced

senate Resolution 454, which embodied the four reservations
recommended by Secretary Hughes.

It was laid upon the

table until the next day.l2
It was hardly expected in the short time which remained
before Congress adjourned that the Senate would be able to
sanction the President'e suggeetions. l3 Some believed that
the President was clever to make the proposal at this late
date in the session with the idea of getting it before the
country so there would be sufficient time for the people to
consider it during the months of the Congressional recess. l4
At first thought it appeared that if the President had
really been interested in this legislation and earnestly
wished its passage he had made a grave mistake in timing
by sending his message to Congress in the clOSing days of a
busy session when aotion on so serious a question was
practioally impossible.

However more serious students of

the Situation readily considered it a very fine pieoe of
timing.

By asking the Senate to consider the Court question

~.,

12

Congo

v 64, pt.5, 4632.

13
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the President had put the issue before the American people,
to be talked of all summer, to be the subject of Presidential
and other utterances on the platform and to c reate a public
sentiment bound to have a decisive influence on the members
of the new Congress.

It was to prove a topic of lively

discussion with Johnson, Borah, and other anti-League
Senators against the plan, and the President for it.
Political commentators forecasted that the discussions would
continue on into the next Republican convention.

Mark

Sullivan thought that it was more than likely that the
World Court question "may have the same relation to the
campaign of 1924 that the League of Nations had to the
of 1920. tl15

~ ~ York .Times, observed that the Harding

Hughes plan for membership ,in the World Court received" •••
a spontaneous and remarkable approval by the press,
irrespective of party and the endorsement of many Americans
of light and leading. n16
Again on March 5, 1923 President Harding reiterated
his proposal in a letter to Lieutenant-Governor Bloom of
Ohio by declaring that,

tt

it is inoonoeivable to me that the

15
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American people who have long been devoted to this ideal,
should refuse their adherenoe now to suoh a program as is
represented by this tribuna1."17

The faot that this letter

waS given rather widespread attention and publicity was
regarded as indicative of the faot that the President was
determined in the nine months of the Congressional recess
to keep his proposal before the American peop1e. 18
President Harding's first pub1io address dealing with
our entrance in the World Court was delivered the following
month on April 24, 1923, bef0re the Assooiated Press, in
New York.
What better

o~~siQn;

could be asked to get this

before the American people than to present it to the press
of the nation?

On

this ocoasion the President admitted that

some observers of the national scene claimed that our
adherenoe to the Court was a move toward becoming a member
in the League of Nations, but he wanted to assure any so
thinking that there was no such thought among those offioials
who shaped American foreign policy.

Still others said that

entanglements with the League would be unavoidable.

But

any relationship With the League would have required the

17

Current History, v.18, 34.

18

rug,.,

39.

;
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assent of the Senate, and this was not to be feared.

But

if by some chance the Senate approved of such action,
Barding promised that his administration would not complete
the ratification.

The President pointed out that there was

only one political bugbear in the fact that in the Assembly
of the League the British Empire had six votes in that
branch of the Court electorate of the Council.

In view of

.the fact that no nation could have more than one judge it
seemed less formidable in the Court than when applied to the
League.

Furthermore, if other nations accepted this voting

strength of the British dominions, we too should have done so
in view of the natural ties of the English speaking race.
Finally Harding commended our adhesion to the Court as a great
step in the direction of peaceful settlement of justiciable
questions. 19
On his trip to Alaska in the summer of 1923 President
Harding stopped in St. Louis and on June 21 spoke about the
Court, laying down two conditions Which he considered
indispensable to our acceptance.

These were:

19 Congressional D~st, A. Gram Robinson and
blishers,' 1923, v. 2, 232-233.
Norborne T. N. Robinson,
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1.

That the tribunal should be
in theory and practice a World
Court and not a League Court.

2.

That the United States should
occupy a plane of perfect
equali~O with every other
power.

He further stated:
There admittedly is a League connection
with the World Court though I firmly
believe we could adhere to the Court
Protocol, With becoming reservations,
and be free from every possible
obligation to the League, I would
frankly prefer the Court's independence
of the League. 2
Harding went on to praise the Court as it was
constituted, but suggested that it be made self perpetuating
in one of two ways:
1.

By empowering the Court to fill
any vacancy which arose from the
death or retirement of a member
without interposition from any
other body.

2.

By transferring the power of
electors from the Council and
the Assembly to the remaining
members of the Permanent Court
of International Justice so that
in fact the Court's member§
elected their 8uccessors.22
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Therefore from these statements of President Harding
~

can see that his policy was characterized by patience.

HiS tactics were those of patience and not forcefulness.
Barding did not attempt to force his proposal through Congress
by legislative manipulation or

executiv~

pressure.

In

considering this policy we must remember that Harding was
a candidate for re-eleotion when this question was brought to
the fore.

It probably would not have been too wise for the

President to attempt foroe or to try to impose hiS will upon
the Senate.

His polioy was also interpreted by some who

thought that he would have oonsidered oonditions other than
the Hughes reservations under which the United States might
adhere to the Court because he had put forth suggestions of
other possibilities.

They thought this was likely to win

over both the Senate and publio opinion. 23
In poor health and oppressed by the oharges already

made against his administration, Harding oontinued on to
Alaska where he fell seriously ill.

On the return trip he

died, at San Franoisoo, August 2, 1923.

Shortly before his

death an address on foreigb affairs, whioh he had prepared
to deliver in San Franoisoo was published.
23

~.,

8.
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attempted to justify the attitude of his administration
toward the League as follows:
If our people are ever to decide
upon war they will chose to decide
according to our own national conscience
at the time and in the constitutional
manner without advance commitment, or
the advice and consent of any power.
To revive the old controversy in
any phase would have been disastrous.
We do not challenge the utility of
the League of Nations to others; we
wish it more power in every
righteous exercise of its functions;
but it is clearly not for us as
presented in the Versailles Covenant. 24
He confirmed the wisdom of the Senate in opposing the League,
and continued:
~

Out of the inevitable Presidential
contacts with the World War's havoc
and destruction and the measureless
sorrows which attended and has followed,
I would be insensible to duty and
violate all sentiments of my heart
and all my oonviotions if I failed to
urge Amerioan support of the
Permanent Court of International
Justice. I do not know that such a
oourt will be unfailing in the
avoidance of war, but I know it is
a step in the right direction. 25
These final words of Harding's left the issue sharply outlined
for his suocessor, Calvin Coolidge.
24 !!:! York Tribune, August 1, 1923.
25
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The World Court issue must have been foremost in the
minds of the Amerioan people, at least in the mind of the
president, for in his first official address to Congress
president Coolidge dealt with the entrance of the United
States to the Court.

The first statement of his policy took

form in his message to Congress on December 6, 1923.

After

paying due respect to the late President, Coolidge said:
Our foreign policy has always been
guided by two principles. The one
is the avoidanoe of permanent
political alliances which would
sacrifice our proper independence.
The other is the peaceful settlement
of oontroversies between nations. 26
Like Hughes, Coolidge too harkened back to the Hague
Tribunal and also gave a ahort history of our attempts and
efforts toward entrance in a permanent international oourt.
He favored our entrance and stated:
By example and by treaty we have
advocated arbitration. For nearly
twenty-five years we have been a
member of the Hague !ribunal, and
have sought the creat ion of a
permanent world court of justice.
I am in full accord with both of
these polioies. I favor the
establishment of such a court
intended to inolude the whole world.
That is and has been an American
policy.27
26

Qrulg.
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Continuing his message to Congress President Coolidge
dealt with the present plan for a world court by stating that
thiS plan with the Hughes reservations was not perfect but
that it was workable and he would like to see the Senate aet
favorable.

He continued by declaring:
Pending before the Senate is a
proposal that this Government give its
support to the Permanent Court of
International Justice, which is a new
and somewhat different plan. ThiS is
not a partisan question. It should
not assume an artificial importance.
The court is merely a convenient
instrument of adjustment to which
we could go, but to which we could
not be brought. It should be discussed
in entire candor, not by a political,
but a judicial method without pressure
and without prejudice. Partisanship
has no place in our foreign relations.
As I wish to see a court established,
and as the proposal presents the only
practical plan on which many nations
have agreed, though it may not meet
every desire. I therefore commend it to
the favorable consideration of the
Senate, with the proposed reservations
clearly indicating our refusal tQ
adhere to the League of Nations. 28

By this statement we see that the President recognized
that the Senate had delayed in its deliberations of the
Court and intimated that because partisan policies had

28

!bid., 97.
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crept into the discussions other considerations had taken
precedence over it.

He considered our adherence to the

Court necessary but he emphasized that it had grown out of
proportion to its importance and he wished it placed in its
proper setting.
Four days later on December 10, 1923 Senator King of
Utah, introduced a resolution which called for United States
adherence to the World Court, with the exception of the
compulsory jurisdiction clause under the Harding-Hughes
reservations. It was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations. 29
That same day Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin offered a
resolution to the Senate which called for adherence to the
Protocol of the Court under certain conditions.

This too

was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

This

included the usual clause found in these resolutions of
adhesion to the Protocol.

The same fear was expressed

concerning the refusal of the United States to enter the
League of Nations or assume any obligations under the League.

In this resolution it was so phrased:

29
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That such adherence shall not be taken
to involve any legal relationship on
the part of the United States to the
League of Nations, or the assumption
of any obligations by the United States
under the covenant of the League of
Nations, constitutisg a part of the
Versailles treaty.'
President Coolidge, in a MemoniaJ Day address in 1924,
said that the Barding proposal had already been approved by
him.

He did not oppose the other reservation, but felt that

any material changes would probably not receive the consent
of the nations and for that reason would be impractical.
He thought that the United States could not take such a
step without assuming certain obligations and surrendering
something.

But the situation had to be faced and an

ambiguous position would accomplish nothing.

The fear of

entanglement with the League seemed unlikely to President
Coolidge with the Hughes reservations.

He thought that

the United States should sustain a Court which it had
advocated for years. 3l

30
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In his annual message to Congress, on December 3, 1924,

Fresident Coolidge declared:
I believe it would 'be for the
advantage of this country and helpful
to the stability of other nations for
us to adhere to the Protocol
establishing that Court upon the
conditions stated in the recommendation which is now before the
Senate, and further that our country
shall not be bound by advisory
opinion whi.ch may be rendered by
the Court upon questions which we have
not voluntarily submitted for its
judgement. This Court would 'provide
a practical and oonvenient tribunal
before which we could go voluntarily,
but to whioh we could not bes~Qned,
for a determination of ~;ustipi~ble
questions when they fail to be
resolved by diplomatio negotiations.32
Even the House of' Representatives was beooming
impatient with the pondering of the Court question in the
Committee of Foreign Relations, the Suboommittee Hearings,
and in the Senate as evidenced by this Resolution adopted by
the House, March 3, 1925.
Resolved, That the House of
Representatives desires to express
its cordial approval of the said
Court and an earnest deSire that

32
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the United States give early
adherence to the Protocol establishing
the same, with the reservations
reoommended by President Harding and
President Coolidge.
Resolved further, That the House
expresses its readiness to
partioipate in the enaotment of
suoh legislation as will
neoessarily follow suoh approval. 33
On

the folloWing day President Coolidge oame out om e

again for the World Court.

He said:

In conformity with the principle
that display of reason rather than
a threat of foroe should be the
determiJljtlK, faotor in the interoourse between nations we have long
advooated the peaceful settlement
of disputes by methods of arbitration
and have negotiated many treaties to
secure that result. The same conditions
should lead to our adherence to the
Permanent Court of International
Justioe.'4
Not being as vociferous as Some of his predeoessors or
as some of his successors in the office of President we are
foroed to rely on his official utterances on traditional
oooasions.

In his annual message to Congress on December 8,

1925 he reminded the Senators that the proposal to adhere

33
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to the Court had been pending before the Senate for nearly
t~e

years although the United States had taken a leading

part in laying the foundation on which this institution
rested.35
In Senate Resolution 5 of January 27, 1926 another
reservation was added to those recommended by Secretary
Hughes in his letter of February 17, 1923.
three years for the Senate to get this far.

It took just
This resolution

stated:
Resolved (two-thirds of the
Senators present concurring), That the
Senate advise and consent to the
adherence on the part of the United
States to the said protocol of
December 16, 1920, and the adjoining
Statute for the Permanent Court of
International Justice (without
accepting or agreeing to the optional
clause for compulsory jurisdiction
contained in said Statute), and that
the Signature of the United States
be affixed to the said protocol,
subject to the following reservations
and understandingS, which are hereby
made a part an~6condition of thiS
resolution ••••

35
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The following reservation incorporated in this
resolution proved to be the famous stumbling-block to American
adherence to the Court.

It declared:

That the Court shall not render any
advisory opinion except publicly after
due notice to all states adhering to
the Court and to all interested states
and after public hearing or opportunity
for hearing given to any state,
concerned; nor shall it, without the
consent of the United States, entertain
any request for an advisory opinion
touching any dispute or question in
which the United states has or claims an
interest. 37
Apparently this would seem that the United States was
sincere in its intentions of adherence to the protocol.
The Senate resolution of adherence with reservations and
understanding, was promptly transmitted by the Secretary of
State to each of the forty-eight member States.

On September

1, 1926, these states met in a conference called at Geneva,
to consider the American proposals and ultimately agreed upon
a plan for accepting the Senate reservations, leaving the
door open for further discussion and explanation if necessary.
The reply was communicated to the United states, but the State
Department made no offiCial reply.

37
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report was unacceptable to the American government was made
bY president Coolidge in his Armistice Day speech.

The

president in discussing the Court noted the fact that no
final answers had been recemved from the signatory powers,
but with the situation as it was then, he felt that he could
not ask the Senate to modify its position.

Furthermore,

unless the Senate proposals were met by the members of the
Court he saw no prospect of the United States joining the
tribunal. 38
Hearst, Borah, the Chicago Tribune

and others opposed

to the Court interpreted the President's address as
acceptance of defeat and as total defeat for the Court, but
as another administration passed on, the question of American
adherence to the World Court was a legacy presented for
solution to the Hoover administration.
Herbert Hoover, in his inaugural address of March 4,

1929 gave strong support to another approach to the Court.
He explained that the reservations sought no special privilege
for us but only clarification of our relation to advisory
opinions.

The new President stressed the fact that:

38 International Conciliation, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, New York, !~27, No.232, 360.
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The Permanent Court of
International Justice is particularly
identified with American ideals and
with American statesmanship •••• The
way should and I believe will, be
found by which we may take our prope r
place in a movement so fugdamental
to the progress of peace.,9
At this point in the development of the World Court
in the United States attention was focused on Elihu Root who

had gone to Geneva to work out a plan that would prove
satisfactory to the Senate and also to the World Court
signatories.

It was indeed, a monumental task.

Root's formula attempted to solve the deadlock between
the two.

His plan was a compromise.

He reaffirmed the

Senate's claim to a veto over advisory opinions and then
set up rules governing the exeroise of this veto power.
The United States was to be notified of every request for
an advisory opinion and discussion was to be invited.

If

this discussion should disclose:
(l) that no agreement can be reached
as to whether the question does touch
an interest of the United States within
the true meaning of the second paragraph
of this article; and

/39
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(2) that submission o~ the question
is still insisted upon a~er
attributing to the objeotion of the
United States the same foroe and
effeot as attaohes to a vote
against asking for the opinion given
by a member of the League of Nations
either in Assembly or Counoil; and
if it also appears that the United
States has not been able to find
the submission of the question so
important for the general good as to
oall upon the United States to forego
its objeot10n, in that particular
instanoe leaving the request to be
acted upon by the Court without in
any way binding the United States;
then it shall be deemed that owing
to material difference of view
regarding the proper soope or
praotice of requesting advisory
opinions, the arrangement now agreed
upon is not yielding satisfactory
results, and that exeroise of powers
of withdray@l provided in Art icle XII
hereof will follow naturally without
any imputation of unfriendliness or
unwillingness to co-operate generally
for peaoe and good W1l1. 40
Root doubted that it would ever be neoessary to put
this solution into use but if this plan was ever put into
practice he felt that it would result in agreement in any
such dispute.

In explaining his plan to the Commission

set by the Oouncil to deal with the question

o~

American

adherence he quite frankly told them this and added that he
believed the apprehension aroused in Washington and in

40 Times, March 7, 1929.
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Geneva to be unfounded but that this had to be guarded
against and he felt this was the way.

This plan was adopted

by the Commission with slight modification made by Sir Cecil

Hurst • 41

It seemed that this was the real solution to the Court
question concerning the United States and that surely when
given another chance the Senate would indubitably consent to
adherence but the catalytio agent oame too late.

By the time

the World Court protocols bad been signed by the foreign
nations concerned the prosperity bubble had exploded and
the depression had hit with full force in October 1929.

The

problem was survival and every effort was strained toward
that end.
A year later there was concern that the submission of
the World Court protocols in the Senate might block
emergency legislation in the short session and thereby
necessitate an extra session.

Nevertheless, President

Hoover in his annual message to Congress on December 10,
1930 declared his pOSition in relation to the World Court
question.

41

In this message we can see that this problem

Ibid., March 12, 1929.
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was no longer a major issue.
"Crash of

t

The country had witnessed the

29" and was definitely feeling the need of

assistance in trying to stem the full tide of the depression.
The pyesident was of course aware of this critical condition
throughout the country and was willing to give
precedence over the Court.
policies, he stated:

it necessary

In making known to Congress his

"I trust the protocols may have

consideration as soon as possible after the emergency relief
and appropriate legislation has been disposed of."

He

continued discussing the Court and gave a brief history
stressing the most recent developments.

He reiterated that

he believed the United States should join the Court and
stated:
••• on January 27, 1926 following
extended consideration the Senate advised
and gave consent to adherence to the
court with five reservations; and it
gave authorisation to effect their
acceptance by an exchange of notes.
Consent to four of these was promptly
expressed at a meeting of the nation
members of the court and after
negotiations undertaken with the
approval of President Coolidge two
protocols were drawn to revise the
statutes of the court in order to
embody their oonsent and also to meet
the fifth reservation. The protocol
of accession of the United States and
the protocol of reviSion have now been
signed by practically all the nations
which are members of the court and have
already been ratified by a large majority
of those nations.
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The prov~s~on of the protocols
free us from any entanglement in the
diplomacy of nations. We can not be
summoned before this court. We can
from time to time seek its services by
agreement with other nations. These
permit our withdrawal from the court
at any t ime without reproach or ill Will.
The movement for the establishment
of such a court originated with our
country. It has been supported by
Presidents Wilson, Harding and Coolidge;
by Secretaries of State Hughes, Kellogg
and St ims on ••••
Through the Kellogg-Briand pact we
have pledged ourselves to the use of
pacific means in settlement of all
controversies. Our great Nation, so
devoted to peace and justice should
lend its co-operation in this effort
[World CourtJ of the nations to establish
a great agency for such pacific
settlement. 4 2
Immediately after this message from the President was·
read Senator Borah recommended that the following editorial

---

from the New York Slm entitled, "When League Court Protocol
Come s Out, Kill It", be included in the re cord.
We might make friends for a
day by entering the leagUe court.
We should make enemies for a
generation when the time came - and
it inevitably would come - when
circumstances compelled us to
withdraw. Let us keep what
friendship we have abroad by

42
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refusing to adhere ••• When the
league court protocol comes •••
into the Senate Chamber it should .
meet its death. And, to make
assurance doubly sure, the Senate
should rescind the resolution whioh
Geneva rejected, thus clearing the
air oompletely of the smoke of
danger. l 3
This defiance on the part of the Chairman of the
loreign Relations Committee against the President's conduct
of our foreign policy is an example of the intensity of
the war waged over the Court.

Consideration of the issue

was postponed for another year in fear of necessitating an
extra session.

Still no solution was found during this

administration and the problem was passed on to the next.
The Roosevelt landslide in November of 1932

swept a

considerable number of Republican Senators out of office
and assured the Democrats of a majority in the Senate of
the 73rd Congress but not until March 1932 did the pressure
of domestic business lessen sufficiently to allow consideration of the Court problem.
This period of waiting for action is summarized in one
of the country's leading newspapers as follows:

43
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Diokens' Ciroumlooution Offioe was
a miraole of speed oompared with
the Foreign Relations Committee of
the Senate when dealing with the
World Court. Year after year,
session of Congress after session of
Congress, it goes on weaving a
tangled web about the whole subjeot.
Just now it has made a report to
the Senate, but with so many
reservations, with so many wiredrawn objeotions and soruples,
that aotion upon the matter seems
impossible. 44
The national oonventions met soon after and both parties
endorsed the Court onoe more, the Republicans more strongly.
Their platform oommended this step toward the settlement of
international disputes by the rule of law and held that we
should join our influenoe and "gain a voice in this
institution, which would offer us a safer, more judicial and
expeditious instrument" than arbitration.

The Demooratio

platform simply advooated, "adherence to the World Court
with the pending reservations."45

One member of the press

maintained that argument for and against Amerioan adherenoe
had long sinoe been exhausted.

The two politioal parties

had favored our joining the Court again and again, "but their
leaders have done nothing about it exoept recommend."

There

was always fear of a long debate, so action on the issue
44
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necessarily waited until a more convenient season.

But

rtjudging from the past, that season will never come.

Successi

congresses and Presidents of both political parties have made
a long and painful record of dilatoriness and indifference
in this matter. It 46
Finally on January 6, 1935 it was thought that the
convenient time had arrived for a serious consideration of
the World Court proposals during the Roosevelt administration.
President Roosevelt called a conference of party leaders
at which it was decided to bring to the fore the Court
protocols. 47
Many

felt that a President as popular as Roosevelt

could certainly evoke prompt ratification and it was
estimated that at this time not more than twelve senators
would vote against the Court.4S
, But signs of opPosition impelled the President to send
a message to the Senate, (on January 16, 1935) in which he
stated:

-

46 Ibid., March 24, 1934.
47

!!U:4.,

January 6, 1935.

48 Ibid., January 12, 1935.
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The movement to make international
justice practicable and servicable is
not subject to partisan considerations
for years Republican and Democratic
Administrations and party platforms
alike have advocate4 a court of justice
to which nations might voluntarily bring
their disputes for judicial decision.
To give concrete realization to
the obviously sound and thoroughly
American policy I hope that at an early
date the Senate will advise and consent
to the adherence of the United States
to the Protocol of Signature of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of
Justice dated December 16, 1920, the
Protocol for the Revision of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of
Justice, dated September 14, 1929,
and the Protocol of Signature of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of
Justice, dates September 14, 1929, all
of whioh were submitted to the Senate
December 10, 1930. 49
Mindful of what had happened in 1926 the President urged:
••• that the Senate's oonsent be given
in such form as not to defeat or to
delay the objective of adherence.
The sovereignty of the United
States will be in no way diminished
or jeopardized by such action. At
this period in international
relationship when every act is of
moment to the future of world peace,
the United States has an opportunity
once more to throw its weight into the
scale in favor of peace.50

49 Cong.
50 Ibid.
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As soon as this message of the President's had been
read Senator Hiram Johnson took the floor to maintain that he
wanted peace and said, "What peace do we gain by going into
the Court or by going into the League of Nations?"

He

stated that going into the Court would "ultimately mean going
into the League of Nations just as surely as night follows
day. "

He also claimed this was the worst moment to go

into the Court, when "all Europe sits on a volcano" and
no one knows when the eruption will come. 51
It is interesting to note that Senator Johnson
rejected any responsibility for the long delays about the
Court.

He maintained:
If Mr. Root had not at the instance
of Sir Cecil Hurst manufactured
something destroying our irreducible
minimum of protection there would
have been no delay.~2
The next day Senator Huey Long, of Louisiana, gave the

Senate what the press termed "a three-hour harangue.

Waving

his arms and shouting at the top. of his lungs," he accused
the Standard Oil Company, of financing wars."

51

Ibid., 479-489.
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This appeared
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to be the beginning of a filibuster and seemed that the
usual process of killing the Court was under way again.
Many resolutions favoring the proposed entrance of the
United States in the World Court are to be found which
show the pressure laid upon the Senators at that time.
To mention just a few:

American Bar Association, Faculty

of Colby College, Montana Bar Association, Women's
Organization of Kansas and also a statement from General
John F. OtRyan urging American entrance.54
communications were also sent by:

Favorable

Rotary Club of Pleasant-

ville, New Jersey, Rotary Club of Dallas, Texas, Bar
Association of Erie, New York, American Legion Posts of New
York, Miami Florida Women's Club, Women's Republioan Club
of Orange, New Jersey, Chamber of Commerce of Wellsboro,
Pennsylvania and National Committee of Republican Women. 55
A letter was also sent from Democrats throughout the country
to Democratic Senators asking for action on the World Court
during the present short session.

E!£.,

This letter was as follows:

54
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As the short session opens, we
think it in order to emphasize the
clear implication of the Democratic
ilatform of 1932 recommending
adherence of the United States to
the World Court with the pending
reservations" •••• we respectfully
urge the exercise of your own
influence toward expediting the
court on the Senate Calendar
••• in order that a record vote may
be reached before adjournment
March 4.
Our'hope is that you share our
view that the Senate should consent
to the ratification of the three
pending treaties which were favorably
reported to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on January 1st
last, and which when ratified will
achieve the adherence of the United
States to the coUrt. 56
This letter was signed by about a hundred prominent
persons throughout the country inoluding:

John W. Davis,

of New York City, former Ambassador to Great Britain;
James M. Cox, former Governor of Ohio; Gilbert Hitchoock,
former United States Senator from Nebraska; George Fort
Milton, historian and publisher of Chattanooga

~.57

We also find a petition circulated by a national
group of Republican women organized to support the
administration's pol:b y of ratification of the World Court
Protocols.

56

This organization was considered to be a
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representative group of women who circulated this petition
extensively through out the country.

The petition

distinctly clarified their stand on the issue by stating
that they were:
••• organized for the so Ie
purpose of making clear to the
public and the Senate the
support which Republican women
through-out the country
entertain for ratifioation of
the three World Court protocols
whioh the u.nit~d states signed
two years ago.~8
The members of this organization were headed by the
Chairman, Mrs. Arthur Levermore, also president of the
Women's National Republican Club and six vice-chairman:
Miss Sarah Schuyler Butler also of the New York State
Republican Committee, Mrs. Worthington Scrants and Mrs.
Grace Semple Burlingham both members of the Republican
National Committee, Mrs. Silas Strawn of Illinois and
Mrs. Charles Taft 2nd, of Ohio.
This committee prepared a message which was sent to
thousands of Republican women voters allover the country.

58
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It urged immediate support for the official Republican
policY and indorsed the adherence of the United states to
the World Court.

This message said in part:

The question now before the
Senate is not whether we shall enter
the World Court. The Senate in 1926
by a vote of 76 to 17 passed a
resolution declaring that we should;
if five reservations were met. 59
The public generally thought that the result could not
be in doubt.

Roosevelt's prestige was great and the mind of

the nation had been made up for a long time.

Only two days

before the vote on the Court was cast the New York Times
declared that "There has. never been a doubt, especially since
the President's message that two-thirds of the Senate would
favor ratification", though it added Roosevelt was "puzzled"
by the methods of the oppOSition in fighting the treaty.bO
On January 29, 1935, the Senate voted on the Court
protocols and defeated them by a vote of fifty-two favoring
adherence to thirty-six against.

Forty-three Democrats and

nine Republicans voted for adherence; twenty Democrats,
fourteen Republicans, and two others voted against.

By

this we see that a strong majority still stood by the Court
59

Ibid.
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but it was not strong enough, for seven votes were lacking
to make the necessary two-thirds. 6l
As could be expected many factors entered into the
rejection.

Overconfidence was blamed by some for the defeat.

others claimed that, "The leadership of the Administration
forces was too languid •••• " and that "Mr. Roosevelt was misle
still other reasons advanced were that, ftwhile the supporters
of the treaty slept ••• its opponents kept up a secret but
effective campaign against it," and that minor causes,
personal and political entered into the defeat but considered
the most important element, was the successful appeal to
have nothing to do with Europe. 62
President Roosevelt made no comment on the vote except
to say, that he was very grateful to Senator Robinson, the
Democratic leader, for the able and honorable fight he had
conducted, and to the other pro-court Senators. 63
Senator Borah stated triumphantly that this was the
most important Senate action since the World War and by
this the Court issue in the United States may be said to have
been officially dead. 6 4
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Immediately after the defeat of the Court, Senator
Robinson, majority leader, wrote an article about the struggle
in which he said that some fifteen senators who were friendly
to ratification, but not unqualifiedly committed, ended by
joining the opposition, while only two votes not counted upon
were picked up.

He ascribed the result to the organized

resistance, which gathered volume, and to its "exaggerations,
misinformation, political threats, and misrepresentations."
pictures were painted "of battle scenes, death, desolation,
and sacrifices to accomplish purposes in no wise related to
the welfare of our people."65
I~

would be thought that the defeat of so serious and

widespread an issue would be cause for a marked reaction, at
least in Washington but this was not the case.

Arthur Krock,

reported that congreSSional leaders, including Senator
Robinson, went serenely about their business.

At the White

House, also, the President seemed in his press conference
"to be sincerely unconcerned about the action of the Senate.
Nothing like a pall hung over official Washington."66
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Quite to the contrary the day following the defeat was
the President's birthday and he was preparing to celebrate it
with the entire nation invited to attend birthday balls held
in his honor, allover the country.
This defeat well illustrates that the failure of the
United States to join with other States in their efforts to
make the Court a universal agency for the development of
international law may be attributed in part to its position
as a non-member of the League of Nations.

As we have seen

the debates as well as the fate of the American reservations,
turned chiefly on advisory opinions, but the hostility to
them was largely due to the fact that the opinions were given
by

the

Court at the request of the Council of the League of

Nations.

The relation of the League to the Court attached such

a stigma to the Court that it ultimately brought it down to
defeat.
In consequence, the Government of the United states
has had.no share in maintaining the Court and has made no
financial contribution to its support.

Though an eminent

American, Elihu Root participated in drafting the Court's
Statute and the American members of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration regularly nominated candidates in the elections
of judges after 1923, and four Americans were successively
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elected as judges of the Court, John Bassett Moore, Charles
Evans Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg, and Manley O. Hudson.
yet with one exception the United states refrained from
entering into agreements with other States providing for
the Court's jurisdiotion; by becoming a member of the
International Labor Organiz.ation, ::the United Stat.es conferred
on the Court the jurisdiotion to be provided for in the
constitution of that organization.
Without challenging the motives of the Senators who
labored for limitations and ultimately defeat of the World
Court protocols, we can not help but question the means used
to attain their end.
For twelve years the Senate professed an ardent desire
for a type of court suoh as provided for in the protocols
presented to them; many times voting for it but always with
some reservations that prevented the aotion whioh they had
professed.

Such a oourse as this dictated by the Senate could

not help but mar its prestige.

CHAP~ER

A~TI~UDES

IV

IN YEARS OF SPECIAL

DEVELOPMEN~

I hope it is practicable, by
improving the mind and morals
of society, to lessen the
disposition to war; but of
its abolition I despair. l
After reviewing the prolonged and entailed developments
over the World Court it is most gratifying and reassuring to
oonsider the Kellogg Peaoe Paot.

~he

oorrespondence between

France and the United States during the years 1927 and 1928
was simple, sinoere and thereby suocessful.

During the

previous deoade a small but influential group, inoluding
Samuel O. Levinson, a Chicago lawyer, and Professor James

~.

Shotwell, of Columbia University, had been urging that instead
of making laws recognizing war as a legal oondition, there
should be laws against war, making it illegal,

Professor

Ihotwell, oonsidered one of the ablest of the leaders of this
movement, while visiting Franoe in the spring of 1927,
presented his i4eas to Foreign Minister Briand.

The result

1 ~homas Jefferson, The Writings g! Thomas Jefferson,
Andrew A. Lipsoomb, Editor, The Thomas Jefferson Memorial
Assooiation, Washington, D.C., 1903, v. 18, 298.
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of these Briand-Shotwell disoussions was the Briand proposal
of April 6, 1927. 2 It was on this day, the tenth anniversary
of the United States entranoe into World War I, that M. Briand
entrusted to the Associated Press his famous message,
addressed to the Amerioan people. 3 Here in this instanoe the
poreign Minister of France challenged publio opinion by his
offer to oommit the Government of France to a renunoiation
of war as an instrument of national policy if the United
states would oooperate with it in this aot Uto outlaw war".
The signifioant passage of this message is as follows:
For those whose lives are devoted
to seouring this living reality of a
polioy of peaoe the United States and
Franoe already appear before the world
as morally in full agreement. If there
were need for these two great demooracies
to give high testimony to their desire for
peace and to furnish to other people an
example more solemn still, France would
be willing to subscribe publioly with the
United States to any mutual engagement
tending"to outlaw war," to use an American
expression, as between these two oountries.
The renunoiation of war as an instrument
of national policy is a oonoeption already
familiar to the signatories to the Covenant
of the League of Nations and of the Treaties
of Locarno. Every engagement entered into
in this spirit by the United States toward
another nation such as Franoe would

2 James T. Shotwell, War As An Instrument of National
Policy, Haroourt Brace and Co., New York, 1929, 45=46.

3 Literar: Digest, November 26, 1927.
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contribute greatly in the eyes of the
world to broaden and strengthen the
foundations on which the international
policy of peace is being ereoted.
These two great friendly nations,
equally devoted to the oause of peace,
would furnish to the world the best
illustration of the truth that the
immediate end to be attained is not
so much disarmament as the practical
application of peace itself. 4
This message did not immediately receive much public
attention.

In fact it passed Virtually unnoticed by the

American press for nearly three weeks.

Then Dr. NiCholas

Murray Butler worte a letter which appeared in a prominent
newspaper on April 25, 1927.

This letter repeated the above

passage from M. Briand's message and asked:
Is it possible that the American
people failed to hear the extraordinarily
important message addressed to them
through the AssOCiated Press •••• If not
what answer db they propose to make J and
how long will they permit M. Briand
to be kept waiting for the answer?5
This communication of Dr. Butler's aroused dormant
public opinion.

Though we find instances of thiS awakening

in the press there was apparently no sudden concerted effort

4
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on the part of the general public to encourage a prompt reply
to M. Briand's proposal.
Undaunted by the coldness of its reception in many
quarters the advocates of outlawry kept up their campaign.
Though the State Department had neglected to answer the
informal question of M. Briand's of April 6, 1927 he was
determined to receive a reply.
No details were specified in his note of April 6, 1927
and technically since this was not presented through. the
proper diplomatic channels no reply was necessary_

But

M. Briand evidently was not content with the reaction.

Since

our treaty of arbitration with France was to expire on
February 28, 1929, he, no doubt, considered this an opportune
time to discuss the subject of a new treaty.

So on June 20,

1927 M. Briand formally submitted the following treaty in
which the State Department could hardly have replied in the
negative and which did necessitate an answer.

TheSe two

short paragraphs are the very heart of the treaty.

Just these

following two articles with the addition of the prOVisions
for Signature and ratification form the entire treaty.

a

s

96
Article 1
The high contracting parties solemnly
declare in the names of their respective
peoples that they condemn recourse to war
for the solution of international contro~
versies, and renounce it as an instrument
of national policy in their relations
with one another.
Article 2
The high contracting parties agree
that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature'
or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise among them, shall gever
be sought except by pacific means.
This message of M. Briand's was followed by a rather
long period of inaction on the part of the United States.
The reasons for this Secretary Kellogg explained in the
following memorandum written at a later date.
The President at this time was in
Dakota spend ing the summer, and I had
nq opportunity to discuss the matter
wi th him. Furthermore, Congre ss had
adjourned, and neither the President
nor I thought it was advisable to
enter into a treaty unless We had
some assurance that it would receive

6
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the ratification of the Senate.
I was criticized by some newspapers
for the delay, but I felt, as the
President did, that in a matter of
this tremendous importance it was
best to make haste slowly and be
sure that we were taking the steps
which would be approved by the
Senate of the United State§ and
the people of the Country."'
Secretary Kellogg claamed that after conversations with
Senator Borah, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
and with members of this committee he came "to the concluSion
that they would not approve a bilateral treaty with France
and the United States; but ••• they would approve a multilateral treaty such as I had in mind, with all the nations
of the world. 118
In the present situation the probable attitude of the
Senate seemed to be a factor of crucial importance.

The

difficulty of ascertaining what this attitude would be in
relation to any proposal that might be made, with the Senate
in adjournment and the President on vacation was obvious.
Mr. Kellogg apparently had a deep sense of the importance
of having the Senate with him.

He, of course, knew the

7 David Bryn-Jones, Frank B. Kellogg, G. P. Putnam's
Sons, New York, 1937, 239.
8
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difficulties that had arisen on other occasions as a result
of the seeming disregard of the Senate perogatives by President
and Secretaries of State in previous negotiations.

The

oontroversies in relation to the League of Nations were still
evident and probably served as a warning to him to proceed
with caution.

It appeared that he was determined at least

not to repeat the more obvious mistakes of the Wilson era.
Therefore his policy which was interpreted as inaction and
delay until December 1927, when the Senate was in seSSion
aotually gave him the opportunity to engage in these
oonversations with the Senate leaders to which he referred.
Certainly there was an advantage in waiting for as
important a factor as the attitude of the Senate, but public
opinion was still important and some delay would give it time
to grow and to clarify.

It is belived by some observers that

Kellogg realized from the beginning of the negotiations ,that
success depended upon the force and intelligence of that
opinion, and that he could not have been unaware that he would
meet obstacles and opposition in protracted negotiations. 9
As experienced a man as he must have realized that a proposal
such as he was contemplating would give rise to suspicions

9
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and objections.

This is apparently the basis for his

revolutionary policy of doing away with the customary method
of secret diplomacy and must ,have determined his course to
conduct the negotiations in the full light of public
inspection with the aid of the press and other agencies for
distribution and dissemination of knowledge.

The success of

the proposals was to prove just how right his decision was
in formulating and in continuing this policy.
By the autumn of 1927 this growth and clarification of
public opinion was quite evident.
presented as indicative of this.

The following opinions are
By November the press had

predicted that public opinion had reached such a pitch that
the proposal to outlaw war promised to be a live subject in
Washington through the winter. lO
The paot is a subject on which we find not so much a
variety of opinions as a variety of people expressing in
various ways approximately the same opinion.

Even the

President was approached for action.
It is noted that a delegation visited the White House
bearing a petition signed by hundreds of prominent churchmen
throughout the country supporting the Briand proposal. 11
10 Literary Digest, November 26, 1927, 11.
11 Ibid.

-
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it that time President Coolidge is said to have announced that

negotiations toward a treaty to outlaw war would be begun as
soon as Ambassador Herrick returned to France.

Which proved

that the treaty would be taken out of the hands of the prese
and the people and dealt with

acco~ding

to strict diplomatic

procedure. 12
Like the treaty which embodied the League of Nations
this pact was hailed, by some, in quite

idea~istic

terms.

After reading the two articles of the proposed treaty one
commentator said, "Those are the magnificent words which
form ••• what is becoming to be known as the Kellogg Peace
Pact.

Read by themselves they outlaw war. ,,13

Another in

comparing it. to the League noticed:
The Covenant of the League required
its members to agree to submit all disputes
to arbitration or inquiry and not to resort
to war until three months after the arbitral
award or report, but it left a gap that
war might then be declared. The Kellogg
plan seems to close that gap. Unqualified
it would constitutela new era in international relations. 4

12
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But it also pointed out that, "unfortunately it is not
unqualified.

Mr. Kellogg's note of June 23 substantially

accept ed the French reservations to his original treaty,"
and held that, "Mr. Kellogg's acceptance of an undefined right
of self-defense is another matter, opening the gates to such
interpretation of his pact as may leave nothing of it."15
Secretary Kellogg answered this indictment by defining
his policy toward the right of self-defense.

He declared:

There is nothing in the American
draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts
or impairs in any way the right of selfdefense •••• Every nation is free at all
times and regardless of treaty provisions
to defend its te~itory from attack or
invasion, and it alone is competent to
decide whether circumstances require
recourse to war in self-defense. 16
Analysis of Mr. Kellogg's explanations of his treaty
led to various interpretations.

Many were led to a suspicion

that perhaps the whole affair was intended, "rather as an
election year gesture to warm the hearts of the American
people toward the Republican Party then as a real forward
step in international relations. 17

15

Ibid.

16

-Ibid.

17 The Nation, The Nation Incorporated, New York, 1928,
v.127, 76.-
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The opposition was not altogether silent.

Drew Pearson

in a Consolidated Press dispatch from Washington pointed out
what he believed to be two weak spots in the Briand plan.
These were:
The well founded fear that such
a treaty negotiated with France alone
would be construed as an alliance; and
the belief that such a treaty would
guarantee the supremacy of France on
the European continent and tie the
hands of the United States in case of
European conflict. 18
He expanded these points by declaring that through
treaties France had built up a "family of loyal nations" which
made her almost supreme on the continent.

His belief was that

only one thing was lacking to make France absolutely supreme.
This was the assurance that the United States would remain
open to her as a source for munitions.

With this country as

a neutral the American Navy would be used to protect American
merchantmen carrying supplies to France, and by this policy
we would be risking a war with the opponent of France and that
"eventually the United States would find itself pulled into
the conflict." 19

18

Literary Digest, November 26, 1927, 12.
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A less forceful yet more pessimistic viewpoint expressed
and flatly declared that, "nations are never going to avoid
violent outbreaks by merely agreeing in advance."20
We are also reminded that there was the Senate to be
considered and that it

'l6S

not an easy matter to get

any

treaty through the Senate.· In considering this aspect it was
remembered that this treaty would go into the Senate with
several millstones around its neck.

There was for instance,

the fact that the debt agreement with France remained
unratified and the fact that France did not send delegates to
the naval disarmament conference at Geneva, and also the
difficulties with France over the tariff question were to be
considered. 21
The New York Times reminded us that:
If favorable sentiment could be
registered in the several States and
at Washington by the time that the
Senate meets again, it should have a
wholesome effect in preparing the way
for such a treaty, not only with France,
but with each of the other Powers, with
which the United States already has
treaties of conciliation that are soon
expiring. 22

20

~.

21

~.

22
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As prospects developed for consideration in the Senate
of the proposals one editor observed that, "the important
is that the Briand plan has been taken out of the pigeon
hole at Washington,."

He claimed that, "President Coolidge can

render the oause of peace a very distinct service by submitt
to the Senate a treaty to carry out the desire that is in the
hearts of the people. n23
The real attitude of the United States upon this issue
was at last becoming artioulate in a way which could not fail
to find expression in Congress.
Throughout the following months this general movement
of American public opinion continued to gain strength and to
find effective expression not only in Congress but outside it
as well.

This fact should not be forgotten as we turn to the

proposals for aotually embodying it on the part of the
Government of the United States.

It should be born in mind

that public opinion throughout the United States gathered
such force in the support of the proposals during the summer
1927 that when Congress met in December there were resolutions
in both Senate and House calling for action.

Two of the most

important and significant were those of Senator Arthur Capper

23

Litera;l Digest, November 6, 1927, 11.

of Kansas, a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations and
Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, chairman of this committee.
These two resolutions received widespread attention throughout
the country.

Though these resolutions did not bring to the

fore any new items of discussion they did epitomize the
consideration of these proposals as brought out in public
discussions since the Briand note.

Senator Borah's

resolution of December 1927, was almost identical With one
presented by him on February 13, 1923 dealing with the
problem of a world court. 24

It was as follows:

Resolved, That it is the view of the
Senate of the United States that war
between nations should be outlawed as
an institution or means for the .
settlement of international controversies by making it a public
crime under the law of nations ••••
Resolved Further, That a code of
international law of peace based
upon the outlawry of war and on
the prinCiple of equality and
justice between all nations •••
should be created and adopted.
Second, That, with war outlawed, a
judicial substitute for war should

24 Cong. Rec., v. 67, pt. 4, 441 and v. 69, pt. 1,
477-478-
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be created ••• modeled on our
Federal Supreme Court ••• to hear
and decide ••• international
controversies •••• and its judgments
shall not be enforced by war under
any name or any form ••• but shall
have the same power for their
enforcement as our Supreme Court,
namely, the respect of all
enlightened nations for judgments
resting upon open and fair
investigations and impartial
decisions, the agreement of the
nations to abide, and be bound
by such' judgments, and the
compelling power of enlightened
public opinion. 25
Senator Capper's resolution reviewed the favorable
attitude of the United States toward adjusting disputes
through "mediation and arbitration" from 1916 to the Briand
note of April 6, 1927, and declared:
Whereas there has been strong
expression of opinion from the
people and the press of the
United States in favor of
suitable action by our
government to give effect
to the proposal of Monsieur
Briand; and
Whereas the present arbitration
treaty between the United States
and France providing for the
submission to arbitration of

25

Ibid., v. 69, pt. 1, 477-478.
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differences of a legal nature
arising between them will
terminate on February 27, 1928 ••••
Be it further resolved, that the
President be requested to enter
into negotiations with France
and other like-minded nations
for the purposes of concluding
treaties with such nations, in
furtherance of the declared
policy of the United States. 26
This resolution continued by stating the definition of an
aggressor nation.

It declared:

By formal declaration to accept
the definition of aggressor nation
as one which having agreed to
submit international differences
to conciliation, arbitration or
judicial settlement, begins
hostilities without having done so •••• 27
It was the opinion of those who watched public opinion
develop that the

~ising

tide of public opinion voiced in

Congress by these resolutions and others was directly
responsible for the negotiations which led to the Pact of
Paris. 28

Secretary Kellogg reported later that there was some
<

opposition but at "least 90 percent of the United States
enthusiastically favored the ratification" and that he

26
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received 500 letters a day requesting action on this issue. 29
Before examining the reaction of others to this plan to
abolish war let us determine what Secretary Kellogg, himself,
had to say about it.

Speaking in New York, on March 15,

before the Council on Foreign Relations, ,he reviewed the
history of the negotiations between France and the United
States from June 20, 1927 the date the formal note was
presented which contained the bilateral provision and then
reviewed his note of Deoember 28, 1927. 30 In this later
note Secretary Kellogg stated:
The Government of the United
states welcomes every opportunity for
joining with the other Governments
of the world in condemning war and
pledging anew its faith in arbitration.
It is firmly of the opinion that every
international endorsement of arbitration,
and every treaty repudiating the idea
of a resort to arms for the settlement
of justifiable disputes, materiall~
advances the cause of V() rId peace.

,1

This was the communication that set forth the
multilateral provision to include, Great Britain, Germany,
Italy and Japan.

In his speech of March 15, Mr. Kellogg

29

Bryn-Jones, 237.

30

Literary Digest, March 31, 1928, 6.

31 Foreign Polic: Association Information Service,
Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1928, v.3, No. 25, 409.
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oontinued by pointing out that France promptly agreed .to thia
idea of a multilateral treaty but that France suggested that
the treaty provide only for the renunciation of wars of
aggression.

Kellogg objected to this and stated the reasons

for this objection.

He said:

My objection to limiting the scope
of an anti-war treaty to mere wars of
aggression is based partly upon a very
real disinclination to see the ideal of
world peace qualified in anyway, and
partly upon the absence of any
satisfactory definition of the word
"aggressor" or the phrase "wars of
aggression". It is difficult for
me to see how a definition could be
agreed upQn Which would not be open
to abuee.,2

Throughout the negotiations we find that Secretary
Kellogg was not agreeable to the use of economic sanctions
to enforce this treaty but he did believe that true
enforcement must come from the peoples of the world.

In

order to maintain peace he declared:
In addition to treaties there
must be an aroused public conscience
against the utter horror and
frightfulness of war. The peoples
of the world must enjoy a peaceful
mind ••• and treaties ••• and the

II
32
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efforts of statesmen to advance the
cause of world peace can only be
regarded as a portion of this problem. 33
Evidently Secretary Kellogg was not as idealistically
inclined as some of his followers or as some
press would have us believe.

memb~rs

of the

In the following statement we

see that he was rather modest in his belief of what the treaty
could do.

He said:
I am not so blind as to believe
that the millennium has arrived, but
I do believe that the world is making
great strides toward the pacific
adjustment of international disputes,
and that the common people are of
one mind in their desire to see the 1
abolition of war as an institution. 34

He was far more modest than many of the other proponents
of the movement to outlaw war.

In the press a variety of

statements showed that for the most part the people of this
country were willing to acclaim this as a momentous action
on the part of the peoples of the world.

One writer hailed

the Kellogg Pact as, "One of the greatest events since the
birth of Christ. fI

Though President Coolidge was more

reserved he called the Pact of Paris tta great step forward in
the preservation of peaceful relations between nations. "35
33

Ibid.
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Secretary Kellogg referred to it as "a moral step forward of
civilization. "36

But James T. Shotwell, one of the early

leaders of the movement, cautioned against any idealistic
type of thinking and called for a practical viewpoint.

He

declared:
The pact of Paris must be
judged, not merely as an expression
of international morals, as some
of its friends have tried to
interpret it, but as the effective
embodiment of political realities;
unless it has some practical value,
it has little value at all. 37
A point worthy of conSideration was brought out by David
Hunter Miller, an authority on the legal aspects of the pact.
What he considered the most striking feature of the KelloggBriand Treaty was one that was not written in its text.
pointed out that the treaty is perpetual.

He

That it contained

no clause of limitation, and no provision for determination
or denunCiation.

It was made to last for all time, except

for the theory that all the signatories would unanimously
agree to end it.

Even the preamble, h.e declared, " ••• indicate

that the Treaty would not be terminated or abrogated by its
violation, even as to a delinquent Party; the Aggressor is
merely deprived of its benefits. Tt38

36
37
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It is also interesting to note that the idea and
very language of the Treaty were adapted from the proposal
of M. Briand of April 6, 1927, which he called a "Pact of
~erpetual Friendship".39

Another item which is also of importance is one to which
it seemed incredible that the Senate ever agreed.

Miller

observed that the treaty was a qualification of the Constitut
He showed that it definitely was an alteration of that
document.

Though he did not use the word "amendment" he

claimed that, "the Treaty marked as real a change in the
Constitution of the United States as would any amendment
proposed by two-thirds of each House and ratified by threefourths of the Senate." 40

By this treaty the war-making

power of Congress was limited.

The Constitution delegates

to Congress the sole right of declaring war, if and when, and
for a valid reason or for no reason at all, but with the
treaty, Congress may not declare war unless and until the
United States has sought and failed to settle the dispute
with the other country "by pacific means".

Congress maY' not

declare war as an instrument of national policy.

39

Ibid.
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declare war only iri self-defense on occasion when the treaty
is violated by another Power. 4l
Miller further clarified this analysis and maintairied
that this limitation was not imposed upon us but rather that
it was of our own choosing and that the United states was not
alone in this alteration of its fundamental law.

He stated:

The Treaty is our own suggestion
our pledge to the ~ivilized world; and
it is also the supreme Law of the Land,
all other Powers by their acceptance
of the Treaty limit their freedom of
action under the hitherto accepted
rules of international law, but like
other Powers with written Constitutions,
we also limit our freedom of action
under our fundamental law; in a very
real sense (not the strict legal sense)
we forever curtail one of the constitutional powers ~f the Congress of
the United States. 4
Had there been a popular opposition to the KelloggBriand proposal, this legal argument would have made itself
heard much more than was actually the case.

The fact that it

was not taken up widely nor strongly supported was an
additional proof that the public opinion of the country
remairied favorable to the proposal.

41

Ibid.

42

~.,

149.

iii

I

114
When had a matter of such extraordinary importance been
expedited as had this Kellogg-Briand Pact?

On

April 6, 1927

M. Briand suggested the bilateral agreement and on August 27,
1928 fifteen nations signed the pact outlawing war "as an
instrument of national policy in their relation with one
another. If

Included amohg the signatories were the

Governments of:

Germany, the United States of America,

Belgium, France, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, Union of South Africa, Irish Free State, India,
Italy, Japan, Poland, and Czechoslavakia. 43

This historic

event took place in the Salle de 11 Horloge of the Quai
D'Orsay.

In our country the pact was warmly heralded in the

press and the general opinion was typified in the following
report :
• •• the Pact of PariS is heart jJ.y
acclaimed in the press, with a small
minority distrustful and fearing that
our national interests are being betrayed.
The general feeling is that whatever the
treaties may lack in legal weight they
make up for by their moral influence. 4 4

QsmC}i!1..1at+oa~
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The Senate, during the short session of the 70th
Oongress whioh met Deoember 3, 1928, was requested by
president Coolidge to authorize ratifioation of the Kellogg
Treaty for the Renunoiation of war.

There was little doubt

that the Senate would be asked to ratify the treaty without
any qualifioation or reservation, inasmuoh as Seoretary
Kellogg insisted upon a similar unqualified aooeptanoe on
the part of the other signatories prior to the signing in
Paris.

Although oomplianoe with the request was gained

only by permitting the several powers to express their
understanding of the treaty in unilateral notes or
declarations, the text of the agreement itself had been
signed in the preoise terms of the Amerioan Secretary of
State without amendment or alteration. 45
Though there was some oontroversy in the Senate
ultimately a oompromise was reaohed.

It was reported from

the Committee to the Senate where the resolution was passed
by a vote of 84 to. 1.

Ratification was signed by President

Coolidge and Secretary Kellogg on January 17, 1929.
dissenting vote was that of Senator Blaine, of

The one

Wisoonsin~

It was his belief that the treaty was of little worth, that

45
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it was "not even a truce. "46

Senator Glass, of Virginia and

Senator Hiram Johnson. of California evidenced ,about the same
amount of faith in the treaty.

Senator Johnson declared

that since "the first casualty when war comes is truth", it
would be a simple matter for a nation in time of need to
declare a war in self-defense.47

Senator Borah came to the

defense of the treaty when he asserted:
No government refusing to come into
conference or refusing to make an
effort for peaceful settlement, could
••• ever afterwards successfully
claim that it was in good faith
acting in self-defense. It would
have great difficulty in satisfying
the public opinion of the world that
it was acting in good faith. It would
indeed be violating the treaty.
Here is •.• a means to test any
government acting not in good faith
under the treaty, and to place it in
• position before the world where it
would be practically impossible to
defend its course or conduct.48
The discussions in the Senate centered not so much aro
the principle involved in the treaty but what procedure would
be followed upon its violation.

From the above statement of

Senator Borah it was evident that the sanction to be applied
in case of violation was the sole sanction of public opinion.

46
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Ibid., 1467, 1781.

48

id ., 1269.

117
A great part of the success of this movement was due
to the fact that for the first time since the peace problem
had become a vital issue in practical politics, all the
peace forces in America were united in support of a sole
definite measure. 49
Another remarkable feature of these negotiations was
that the United States led in a new renunciation of war less
than ten years after her failure to enter the League. Even
more remarkable and stranger still was the fact that the
United States Senate, led by Senator Borah, ratified the pact.
In comparison to other diplomatio negotiations few
notes were exchanged among the parties involved.
~he

In fact all

documents concerning this pact are oontained in one small

volume and most of these transaotions were publicized as
they were sent to the respective parties.
innovation in international relations.

This was an

The people, and the

Governments of the people concerned, should be complimented.
Especially sincere compliments should be tendered Secretary
Kellogg and M. Briand for the execution and consummation of
their ideal.

49
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In his Armistice Day address of 1929, President Hoover
summarized the two modes of procedure possible in case of an
outbreak of violence.

He said:

The European nations have by the
Covenant of the League of Nations,
agreed that if nations fail to
settle their differences peaceably,
then force should be applied by
other nations to oompel them
to be reasonable. We have refused
to trave 1 this road. We are
confident that at least in the
Western Hemisphere that public
opinion will suffice to oheck
Violence. This is ~he road we
propose to travel. 5
Little did he realize then that the first test of this road
was to be the road-bed of the South Manchurian Railway , it
was on this ground that the first real test of the Kellogg
Peace Pact was tried.
The key to the problem involved in the Manchurian crisis
was the system of transportation.

The dependence of

Manchuria upon rail transportation meant that those who
controlled the railroads had a very powerful influence in the
oontrol of the country.

50
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The real foundation of Chinese influence in Manchuria,
however, was the actual settlement of the country by the
Chinese.

The small farmers and ordinary laborers of

Manchuria were almost all Chinese.

Even in theoterritory under

Japanese control, where Japanese labor was in a more favorable
position the Chinese were the predominant workers.5l

It

was partially because of this situation that public opinion
was favorable to China.
was Chinese territory.
following article.

It was widely thought that Manchuria
This opinion was evidenced in the

It was estimated:

The general public the world over
believes that Manchuria is a part of
China and therefore occupancy by any
other nation is an act of war.52
Since the adoption of the Kellogg Pact the Chinese
diplomats had two alternatives to which they could turn for
assistance in the settlement of their problem with the Japanese
They could appeal to the United states in case of a threat of
war on the basis of the Kellogg Pact or they could petition
the League for protection of their rights under the Covenant
of the League.

51
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Hostilities officially broke out during the night of
september 18, 1931 when Japanese troops seized the capitol
of Manchuria.

In justification of this act it was alleged

that some Chinese soldiers had tried to blow up the track of
the South Manchurian Railway north of Mukden.

The morning of

the 19th found a barracks of the Manchurian army, Mukden,
and some of the surrounding towns in the hands of the
Japanese. 53

It is interesting to note that the Lytton

Commission set up by the League to investigate the difficulties
between the Chinese and the Japanese was never convinced that
the Chinese had made this attack on the railroad.54
This difficulty was referred to the League which was in
session at that time.

It attempted to act promptly but all

the League members could not agree on the correct procedure
nor would the United states assist tD bring about an immediate
investigation of the problem.
wan~

The State Department did not

to approve a commission of inquiry or

t,o'~Teethat
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Kellogg Peace Pact had been Violated, since it did not wish
to injure the diplomatic relations with Japan and thus weaken
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the moderate government in power.

Ambassador Debuchi of

Japan had seemingly convinced Secretary Stimson that any
pressure would only weaken the power of the civilians in
the Japanese Cabinet.55
The reaction to this was not generally expressed for
it was not widely known but one report noticed:
No one on the inside is likely ever
to forget the de·~p gloom and bitter
disillusionment that overwhelmed the
League officials then, while the
Japanese grew arrogant. Apparently
frantic messages that night convinced
Washington it must try to lIDdo the
mistake, for Mr. Stimson rushed into
print with a note expressing "wholehearted fI sympathy with League efforts.
The American public, seeing only this
note, neVer got the impression that
Washington had faltered, b~t looking
backward behind the scenes Geneva finds
it came too late irremediable
psychological harm had already been
done and the favorable moment had
gone forever.56
The American note of September 22 to Japan stated very
precisely that it considered Japan responsible for the
cessation of hostilities.

It affirmed:

55
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The actual situation is that an arm
of the Japanese Government is in
complete control of South Manchuria
••• the responsibility for determining
the course of events with regard to
the liquidation of this situation
. rests largely upon Japan, for the
Simple reason that Japanese armed
forces have seized and are exercising
de facto control in South Manchuria. 57
After suggesting that there be "no further application
of force,"the note ended by stating:
What has occured has already shaken
the confidence of the public with
r~gard to the stability of conditions
in Manchuria and it is believed that
the crystallization of a situation
suggesting the necessity for an
indefinite continuance of military
occupation would ~urther undermine
that confidence. 58
These were rather strong words

f~om

the United States to

Japan, but the ·Japanese leaders must have realized that the
United States probably would not be able to unite with the
League with pressure strong enough to restrain them.
Since remonstrances and promises did no more than delay
Japan's onward sweep of conquest the American Government went

57
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on record as emphatically opposed to this p01icy.

Both

China and Japan were notified that the American Government
would not recognize any agreement between these two government •
This declaration has become known as the Stimson Doctrine.
It stated that the Government would not admit the legality of
any de facto situation ncrdid it intend:
••• to recognize any treaty or agreement
entered into between those governments,
or agents thereof, which may impair the
treaty rights of the United States or
its citizens in China, including those
which relate to the sovereignty, the
independence, or the territorial and
administrative integrity of the
Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China,
commonly known as the open;door
policy; and that it does not intend
to recognize any Situation, treaty,
or agreement which may be brought about
. by means contrary to the covenants and
obligations of the Pact of Paris of
August 27, 1928, to which treaty both
China and Japan, as well as the United
States, are parties.59
Copies of this doctrine were forwarded to the Signatories of
the Nine Power Treaty with the hope that it would be possible
to apply this to the situation at Shanghai and in Manchuria
but this too was with out success. 60
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Though the Japanese objected to the United states being
invited to meetings of the League Counoil this objection was
over-ruled and Prentiss B. Gilbert was the United States
representative of the Council.

He was instruoted by the

State Department to participate in its discussions only "when
they related to the possible application of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact.

• •• If present at the discussion of any other aspect of

the Chinese-Japanese dispute, it must be only as an observer
and auditor."bl

Apparently public opinion was approbative to

action on this basis of the Kellogg Pact, for a survey of
newspapers showed that 202 favored action and 28 opposed
American participation at the League Council. 62
The following address delivered by Senator Walsh, of
Montana, expressed a favorable attitude to the League but it
also revealed that some still bitterly opposed any relation of
the United States to the League.

Senator Walsh said:

••• the President ••• has aroused the
ire of critics of the League of Nations.
They have recently poured on him •••
their wrath, because of his attempts
to compare the «ifferences which
have resulted in a state of war in
Manchuria ••• because to that end he
has joined with the Council of the
League of Nations consisting of

61
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representatives of 13 of the first
powers. One is led to believe that
in their unrestrained venom toward
the League of Nations they would
rather that open warfare ••• should
ensue than that the League should
be gredited with a part in averting
it. 3
He continued by exalting the policy of cooperation with
the League.

He maintained:
While conceding the high-mindedness
of the isolationists, those of us
who do not concur in the do-nothing
policy, though invictives be hurled
at us, our motives impugned, our
patriotism questioned ••• modestly
maintained that ours is the more
effective, the more Christian
policy, and I may add, it has the
approval I believe, of the vast
majority of the American people. 6 4

The American press in the winter of 1932 was concerned
mostly with economic f)8;'ncttons and mandates in relation to
the Manchurian situation.

The big question was whether Japan

would be able to retain the mandate over the strategic islands
in Pacific if she withdrew from the League.

All eyes were

focused on the Mandate Commission of the League of Nations
which was to decide this leading question. 65
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A feature artiole in one of the oountry's prominent
newspapers typified the attitude of the Amerioan people toward
the inhabitants of Manohuria.

It was very sympathetio to the

oooupants of the disputed territory and played up the faot
that their fate was in the hands of Geneva. 66

Though it was

also noted that United States trade with Japan had not
deoreased sinoe the Japanese oooupation of Manohuria. 67
It was granted that the Amerioan people were sympathetic
to the inhabitants of Manohuria but aotually the general
opinion was that "millions of plain people care little about
Manchuria but muoh about the peaoe machinery."

Another

statement claimed the American people realized:
••• that the issue cannot be regarded
as a satisfactory test of the League's
honesty or of the Kellogg-Briand Pact
simply because China's policy was indefensible.
Some ardent friends of the League and with
them, apparently, Secretary of State Henry
T. Stimson, as an equally ardent friend of
the ~act of Paris would like to see some
formal oensure of Japan's actions, accepting
the consequences in the hope that publio
opinion of the world would approve and
inflict some kind of moral ostraoism
on Japan. 68
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In reviewing the negotiations pertinent to this crisis
it was quite evident how very differently they were conducted

from those relating to the creation of the Kellogg Pact.

In

this instance the State Department lapsed into the traditional
methods of secret diplomacy.
this fact.

Secretary Stimson reiterated

While the Japanese Cabinet was being changed by

rather revolutionary means from the hands of the moderate
government to the power of the military leaders little was t
the American public the exact nature of their part in the
negotiations to bring about a settlement between China and
Japan.

Secretary Stimson stated this was done to protect the

moderate government in Japan and to give "it an opportunity
to regain control of its own trucu1ant elements. "69
He continued by unwittingly causing a very serious
indictment to be recorded against his, administration of the
State Department.

He declared:

I finally concluded that the time
had come when the cause of peace was
no longer best served by a situation
in which the normal methods of
diplomacy left the public opinion of
America practically unguided
voiceless in this controversy."f

ans

69

Stimson, 73.
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Ibid.
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How could he or any other official justify the responsibility
of leaving the American people "unguided and voiceless?"
In retrospect stimson tried to relieve the blame from
the League by claiming that, too, much was expected from it
in

~ts

first major invocation.

He declared:

Some critics have blamed the
nations not at once setting in
motion stronger machinery of
compulsion against Japan; for not
having at once invoked the
pressure of economic sanctions.
These critics dis'regard the
limitations of man in international
action. True, the power to invoke
such measures existed within the
League Covenant; but it had never
been used. Mankind does not at once
jump into the skillful use of new
international machinery. The road
of progress is ••• strewn with the
wrecks oflprevious unsuccessful
efforts. 7
That the Lytton Report reviewed the entire controversy and
made recommendations for a settlement was about the only
lasting contribution that grew out of these negotiations in
conne ction with the League.

This report at least proved that

the machinery of'the League could establish the essential
facts of a controversy even though it OQuld not successfully
cope with them when once established.

71

Ibid., 83-84.
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Throughout the discussion the basis for the intervention
of the United States in the dispute was the application of the
Kellogg Pact.

The United States seemed to be in a position

where it could actually do very little. It had invoked a
treaty which had no enforcement machinery behind it, other
than public opinion.

If world opinion had in it any power

to halt hostilities this crisis was the time for it to make
its influence known.

t

If the Kellogg Pact, which staked every-

thing on the power of public opinion, was not to be discarded
this was the opportune time to invoke this sanction of world
opinion.

But hostilities continued and none of the great

powers of the world could settle the dispute.
The illusion of a war free world began to crumble in
1931 with Japan's invasion of Manchuria.

This dispute was

watched cautiously throughout the world.

EVen three years

before this outbreak when hostilities began smoldering it
was estimated:
The most difficult situation
which our State Department has had
to face this year is brought about
by the Japanese ultimatum.72

72

L

Litera;l Digest, July 7, 1928, 13.
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Most observers realized that this could bring on an
e'xtensive wa.r and all efforts were directed to avert this
outcome.

In the opinion of one authority in the field of

neutrality, "when the war was over, the American attitude
towa:rd neutrality changed" and the American people took
shelter in the policy of isolation. 73 ' He based this on the
following theory and stated:
••• a considerable body of publiC
opinion, disillusioned by the
results achieved at the Peace
Conference (and it is immaterial
whether and to what extent such
disillusionment was justified)
clamored for a return to the
policy of isolation.74
The defeat of the World Court in 1935 quickened the
isolation cause.

If the Court had been brought up in the

succeeding years it probably would have received a smaller
vote each time.
On August 31, 1935, as Mussolini plunged toward the
conquest of Ethopia, our first neutrality

Jaw

was enacted.

It applied on arms embargo impartially to all future
belligerents.

International Conciliation, No. 358, 74.
74 Ibid.
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On October

from

~igid

5, 1937, the President momentarily escaped

neutrality and encourged by contact with the

crowds on a long trip, wrote into his Chicago speech some
sentences apparently not scrutinized by all of his advisers on
foreign affairs.
powers.

He actually spoke of "quarantining" warlike

Isolationists everywhere took instant alarm.

Their

reaction was so intense that in his fireside talk of October
12 the President spoke only of co-operating with the other
signatories of the Nine Power Treaty "including China and
Japan".

Senator Pepper explained "quarantine" as merely

letting a troubled area alone, but Senator George of Georgia
served stern warning that he would not vote for any measure
which would enable the President Uto declare who is the
aggressor, to say nothing about quarantining the aggressor,
because, in my judgement when we take that stand, we take a
step towards war. "75
After Japanese airman sank the American gunboat Panay
on the Yangtze River, December 12, 1937, the isolationists in
Washington rushed to force out of the House committee the
Ludlow resolution to require a national referendum before
war could be declared, "unless our territory were directly
invaded. It

The Hearst press and several peace :SOCieties

75 Times, October 13, 1937.
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chimed in - notably the National Council for the Prevention
of War and the Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom - and the administration had all it could do to defeat
the resolution in the House.

Thereby the congressional

isolationists made a drive to make it impossible either for
themselves or any future Congress to accept war until bombs
were raining on our own heads. 76
There was a storm of demands that we retire from the
Far East and have no dealings with the British in the Orient
or elsewhere.

Hitler's legions conquered Austria, March 11,

1938 without any American condemnation.

Our attention turned

to weaning Mussolini away from Hitler, a hope which did not
die until the day he struck Erance

~n

the back.

Secretary Hull

denounced isolation and warned of war ahead and on August 18
the President assured Canada that we would "not stand idly by
if domination of Canadian soil is threatened."77
The neutrality laws were not revised.

Hitler invaded

Poland on September 1, and devastated her from end to end
on the first day.

Then,. as there was no important fighting

between Germany and the Franco-British Allies, Senator Borah
termed the war "phony".78

i
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Former President Herbert Hoover in appraising the
strength of the Allies on October 3, 1939, saw no "pOSSibility
that they can be defeated."

They control the seas, said

Hoover, and can "sit there until their enemies are exhausted,"
at the worst there would be a stalemate.

"Even if Russia and

Italy joined Germany in actual Warfare the Allies would still
retain control of the seas.

Germany might try a quick,

overwhelming attack", he added, but there was "little reason
to believe it can su,cceed. tr

Therefore "we need to keep cool.

For after all we must keep out of this war.

We would be

yielding the last strand of democracy if we got int·o it,
win or lose. ,,79

79 Catholio World, Paulist Press, New York, 1939,
v. 150, 273.

CBAPrER V
ATTITUDE OF NATION IN 1939
And peace itself is war in masquerade. l
The attitude of the United States Government towards
the agencies of international c'o-operation which developed
out of the peace settlement of 1919 became considerably more
fully defined during the fateful year of 1939, despite or
perhaps even because of

the fact that the world was once

again moving relentlessly toward and eventually entering a
second period of widespread hostilities.

It was reported:

The American Government gave
fuller expression of its views towards
the League of Nations than in any year
Since 1919 and considerably strengthened
its already strong position as a member
of the International Labor Organization.
It was only toward the Pennanent Court
of International Justice that no
development took place during the year. 2
The year 1939 marked the twentieth anniversary of the
Washington Conference of the International Labor Organization.

1 John Dryden, "Absalom and Achitophel", The Works of
John Dryden, Editor, George Saintsbur,y, William Patterson,-:1
ECiIiiburg, 1884, v. IX, pt. I, line 752, 2 8 8 ' 1
2

International

Con~iliation,
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No. 361, 209.
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On

November 15, a dinner was given in the Capital to

commemorate this event.

A few days later President Roosevelt,

in a letter to the Conference in Havana, declared:
Twenty years of the International
Labor Organization's existence have
proved the usefulness of such an
organization in time of peace. I am
confident that it can and will be
of service to its members, indeed to
society as a whole, in time of war.
Its many activities make it a focal
point from which should come constant
reminder in these tragic times that
human civilization can flourish only
under conditious of just and humane
relationships.'
Co-operation with the League had increased greatly.

It

was a gradual evolution from non-recognition to co-operation.
By 1927 it was reported that the co-operation of the United
States with the ordinary activities of the League was
constant and cordial.

An official of the Secretariat said

that "communications go back and forth quickly.

There is the

utmost courtesy and friendliness and the Washington Government
co-operates about as far as possible, given existing
circumstances. "4

This policy of mutual co-operation continued

to grow and develop.

In Secretary Stimson's estimation this

3

Ibid., 257.

4

Times, March 28, 1927.
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'I co-operation

was largely based upon the effective influence

of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in promoting the recent emergence
of the United States from the accentuated isolationism which
had marked its attitude towards the League of Nations since
the Great War. It 5
Further evidence of this cooperative spirit was given
when the League accepted an invitation to participate in the
New York World's Fair. 6
political field.

This cooperation never reached the

In remembering the achievements of the

League attention was invariably called to the non-political
advancements.
One observer stressed:
••• the point ••• that by its mere
existence the League has given an
unprecedented stimulus to
international cooperation. 7
To clarify this point he continued:
The very fact that there has been
in operation a permanent agency
with an annual assembly, a quarterly
Council, manifold committees, and a
permanent staff and an adequate
budget has made it possible for

5 Stimson, 100.
6

International

Conciliatio~

No. 361, 209.

7 Foreign Affairs, v. 19, 192.
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many international activities to
catch the world's attention,
receive a hearing, and be given
whatever encouragement they
deserved. 8
Archbishop Mc Nicholas of Cincinnati voiced his opinion
toward the happenings of the year in a letter to members of
his archdiocese.

The trend of thought that was eminent is

evident in this pastoral letter.

Archbishop Mc Nicholas

wrote:
Not only must we remain aloof from
the present war, but there seems
to be no moral justification for
our participation in it. Every
Catholic citizen should weigh
seriously the question whether he
can conscientiously partiCipate
in a war that is entirely
unnecessary for us Americans and
which he regards as morally
wrong. 9
The editor of this periodical envisioned us as being
capable of remaining as impartial judges.

He stated:

••• we Americans are in the position
of onlookers, not participants in
the war. There is on that account
more chance of our being impartial
judges in the matter of guilt and
blame than if we were from England
or Germany or Russia. 10

8

Ibid., 193.

9

Catholic World, v. 150, 261.

10

Ibid., 262.
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In the later part of the year, 1939, a very interesting
and revealing exchange of notes took place between President
Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII.
In the following paragraph from his note of December 13,
1939 President Roosevelt set the tone of'these letters.

He

wrote:
Because, at this Christmas time, the
world is in sorrow, it is especially
fitting that I send a message of
greeting and of faith. Tne world
has created'for itself a divilization
capable of giving to mankind security
and peace firmly set in the foundations
of religious teachings. Yet, though
it has conquered the earth, the sea
and even the air, civilization l~day
passes through war and travail.
In continuing the President showed evidence that elouds
of war were gradually approaching.

He continued:

Because the people of this nation
have come to a realization that time
and distance no longer exist in the
olden sense, they understand that
which harms one segment of humanity
harms all the rest. They know that
only by friendly association between
the seekers of light and the seekers of
peace everywhere can the forces of
evil be overcome. 12

11

International Conciliation, No. 357, 49.

12

Ibid., 50.
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In reply to this message Pope Pius XII declared:
We have been particularly impressed
by one characteristic feature of
your Excellency's message: the
vital, spirtual contact with the
thoughts and feelings, the hopes
and the aspirations of the masses
of the people, of those classes,
namely, on whom more than others,
and in a measure never felt before,
weighs the burden of sorrow and
sacrifice imposed by the present
restless tempestuous hour •••. In
fact our own daily experience tells
us of the deep-seated yearning for
peace that fill§ the hearts of the
common people. l ,
From these conflicting shades of opinions it can be
accurately predicted that the place which the League of
Nations deserves in the history of this period will doubtless
be the subject of controversy for decades to come.
There is a truism of the law that "justice long delayed
is justice denied" and this seems all too evident in the case
of the League of Nations.

From what we have seen the people

apparently were in favor of the League in 1919.

The election

of 1920 was not a mandate against the League as was later
interpreted.

The people went to the polls and voted not

against the League in particular but against Wilson and his
administration.
13

Ibid., 51
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Disillusionment had enveloped the country partly
because of the Treaty of Versailles.
with its provisions.

Few were satisfied

The German element thought it unfair

and those of Irish and Italian extraction were disappointed
by the outcome.

Disillusionment was also felt because

during the war America was told and led to believe that she
was fighting for an exalted cause that she was fighting
tlto llake the world safe for democracy".

When the soldiers

returned and realized that this had not been achieved they
too were disillusioned.

That their efforts bad apparently

been in vain made them want to let Europe take care of its
self and to wash their hands of the whole affair.
That the League of Nations was analyzed to defeat
seems true for if the League had been presented to the
people of the nation in a national referendum at the time
it was presented to the Senate there seems little doubt
from the evidence we have examined that this would have been
the overwhelming victory in favor of the League.

This would

have been the mandate •.. The people would have enjoined
Congress to vote to accept membership in the League.

i
I

1

I[ ,
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Bear in mind this would have been presented before the
Senate had brought out all the imaginable and some
unimaginable pitfalls that would befall the United States
if she enter the League.

By the time the Senate had

haggled and struggled over this, the fire of their spirit
had cooled into a firm nationalism.

They had become wholly

disillusioned that the good fight they had fought had not
been a total victory but had opened new and broader avenues
of discontent.

The fight had been futile.

had not savedthe world for democracy.

Certainly it

So the publio sentiment

turned from one of helpfulness to that of disillusionment.
The general opinion was that we fought and won their
fight now the least they could do was to bandage the
wounds and recuperate without our assistanoe.
Through the years the League as an issue was dusted
off and brought out for an airing in order to stir up this
purposeful indignation but we never find the publio aroused
to a frenzy over its aoceptanoe or rejeotion.

Evidenoe of
\

thiS is presented in the following manner.
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This graph shows the number of entries in the Readers
Guide to Periodical Literature under the heading "League of
Nations" •

Not all of these articles were favorable to the

League, on the contrary some were in direct opposition to it.
Though this graph does not show the degree or intensity of
attitudes toward the League, during this period, it does
Show the degree of interest the nation showed toward the

I
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League and this is one means of obtaining a true reflection
of the attitudes.

This is not an indication of attitudes

pro or con but it is a barometer of interest.

By analyzing

this evidence of interest we can see that interest in the
League certainly was far from static.

It fluctuated

throughout this period but the general trend was always
down, less and less interest was shown from the zenith 1n
1919 to an almost negligible degree in 1939.

In the period

1919 to 1921 it was found that 586 entries were listed; in
the 1922 to 1924 period there were 279; a very slight
increase to 282 was evident in 1925 to 1928; in the next
grouping 1929 to 1932, 216 entries were found; from 1932
to 1935 there were 230 listed; 1935 to 1937 only 125 articles
were listed; in the last period a drop to 39 was evident.
From 586 items in 1919 to 39 in 1939 is certainly a decrease
of importance in a twenty year period.
I I

That it is difficult to refrain from estimating the
actions of the American people and of their representatives
~uring

this period 1919 to 1939 1s true.

From the vantage

point of 1948 it becomes all too easy to give sage advice and
leaves us wondering why such mistakes must be made.

hz

It
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certainly facilates an examination but it does not give a
true picture, the features, the movements are distorted.
We certainly have not sucoeeded in reta·ining the peace so
sought for at this time so perhaps it would have been to
our advantage to have joined the League of Nations in 1919.
Who can say what course of action would have been best?
Certainly it is not fair to say as some have that the full
blame for the default of the League of Nations rests on the
shoulders of the United States.

Certainly if all other

nations of the world had joined together to maintain the
peace and did, the United States would not have been the
nation to break this charm.
The peace problem should be considered in the light
of practical politics.
terms of idealism.

We can no longer dream of it in

When we face it on these terms we realize

how vast a change is called for in the proposal to rid the
world of war.
Now we have an advantage over those who lived during
this time, those who were too close to view it in its entire
perspective.

We have the advantage of time.

We are far

enough removed from the phenomenon that we can see it less
disturbed by the immediate preoccupations of statesmanship
I'
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than was possible at that time of conception.

Though this

clarity of vision as to the ultimate end to be achieved is
ours we cannot take full advantage of this and still give the
historical corrective.
Therefore, lest we turn to cast judgment on whether or
not the past proposals achieved all that was claimed for
them by their proponents, we should pause a moment to meditate
on just what it would mean today for the nations of the world
to renounce their most potent policies.
Little hope can be offered the peoples of the world
until each and everyone of them wishes the abolition of
war and the maintenance of peace.

Even the word maintenance

is too hopeful a word for by its very connotation it assumes
that peace is existent and that it is just to be affirmed Oh, that that were true - flit is a consummation devoutly to
be wished."
Peace seems to be all too easy a condition to idealize
but all too difficult a problem for the world to solve.
This solution will never be obtained until it is earnestly
invoked in the heart of man.

CHAPTER VI
CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES
SOURCE MATERIAL
1.

Government Publications
The Congressional Record, United States Government
Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

All volumes of the

Record pertinent to this period were investigated.
Especially thorough examination was given volumes
59 to 79 which yielded many evidences of attitudes.
These volumes were indispensable to a thorough analysis
of the subject.

-The

United States and the Pennanent

---

Court of International

Justice, United States

Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1930.
Contains documents relating to the question of American
accession to the Court.
Enquiry Appointed

~

Report of the Commission of

the League of Nations, United

States Government Printing Office, 1932.

The title of

this document stated clearly its contents in relation
to Manchuria.

Senate Document No. 55, 72nd Congress,

1st Session, United States Printing Office, 1932.
This document relates to the conditions in Manch1.U'lia.
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It was transmitted from President Hoover to the Senate
where it was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations for

advisem~nt.

The

~

of Paris - Three

Years of Development, United States Government
Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1932, is an
address broadcast by, Secretary of State, Henry L.
Stimson.
2.

General Publications
The Democratic

!!!!

~

- 1920, issued by the Democratic

National Committee, 1920 and The Republican

~

Book -

1920 were both used to obtain the party platforms in
this election. Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly,
The 1924 Campaign -

!E

Analysis, Richard R. Smith,

New York, 1927 and by the same authors:

The 1928

Campaign - An Analysis, Richard R. Smith, New York,
1931 and The 1932 Campaign - An Analysis, Farrar and
Rinehart, Incorporated, New York, 1935.

Explanations

of the vote and interpretations of its meaning are
presented.

Edgar E. Robinson, The Presidential Vote,

Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1934,
and by the same author They Voted

!2!

Roosevelt,

Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 1947.

----------------------......
148
These two volumes give a complete analysis of voting
since 1896 to 1944 including many maps, tables and
graphs.

Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of

International Relations, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1925, is a very scholarly treatise on the
Court •

David Hunter Millet, The Peace

G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928.

~

2!

P~a~r~i_s,

This presents a thoroggh

study of the Kellogg Peace Pact stressing the legal
aspects with an excellent documentary appendix
containing all the published correspondence pertaining
to the negotiations of the Pact.

James T. Shotwell,

War As An Instrument £! National Policy, Harcourt
Brace and Company, New York, 1929.

The Prefaoe to

this volume contains the author's opinions which were
indicative of that period and of the leaders of the
movement.

As Director of Economics and History for

the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace he has
been able to exert his influence to further the peace
movement.

An

instance of the furtherance of this

influence is evident in his later book, Qa the Rim of th
Abyss, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1936.

i
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Arthur N. Holcombe,

~

Political Parties Qf To-Day,

Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1924.
Presents a general treatment of the Republican
Democratic party politics.

Woodrow Wilson,

~

and
Hope

of the World, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1920.
Gives evidences of Wilson's attitude toward the
League during 1919 which is reflected through the
messages and aqdresses delivered by him during 1919,
including his country-wide speeches in behalf of the
Treaty and the Covenant.

3.

Publications of Learned Organizations
International Conc.ilia1tLG:1I}, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, New York, Volumes numbered 228
to 363 yielded an inestimable amount of pertinent
source material.

World Peace Foundation Pamphlets,

Volume 7, Published by the World Peace Foundation,
Boston, 1924.

These pamphlets are similar to those

of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
and were used because they contained opinions and
attitudes of authorities in the field under investigatio •
The Annals, Published by the American Academy of
Political and Social Science is an excellent publication
worthy of extensive use.

Volumes of the years 1931-1936
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were most helpful for the topiCS under consideration.
Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Volumes
3-6, Foreign Policy Association, New York 1928.

The

appendix to volume 3 contained the texts of the Hotes
exchanged between United States and France for the
outlaw of war.
~,

E! International

The American Journal

Volume 27, Published by the American Society of

International Law, New York, 1933.

This was utilized

for the relation of the Pact of Paris to the Manchurian
dispute.

A feature of this publioation entitled

"Chronicle of International Events" proved to be
an excellent and unanticipated source of bibliographical
material.
4.

Biographies - Autobiographies
Ray Stannard Baker, !oodrow Wilson:

His

Volumes 1-6, Garden City, 1927-1937.

hl!!

~

Letters

A great work by

the authorized biographer of Wilson, the founder of
the League of Nations.
and

~

League

New York, 1925.

2!

Henry Cabot Lodge,

Senate

Nations, The Maomillan Company,

An apologia of his life which reveals

the Senator's bitter partisanship.
Seventy Years of Life

I.

~

~

Labor -

Samuel Gompers,
~

Autobiography,

....

----------------------------
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2 Volumes, E. P. Dutton and Company New York, 1925,
was useful in giving Gompers own views and his
interpretation of labor's attitude concerning the
League.

Henry L. Stimson, The

!!r Eastern CriSiS,

Harper and Brothers, New York, 1936.

This volume is

anautobiograppy dealing exclusively with Secretary
Stimson's work in the Manchurian dispute.

David

Bryn-Jones, Frank B. Kellogg, G. P. Putnam's Sons,
New York, 1937 is a very sympathetic treatment of
Kellogg's entire life though emphasiS is laid upon
his work for the Kellogg Peace Pact.

It is vitalized

through direct memoranda of Mr. Kellogg's.

5.

Periodicals
The Literary Digest, Funk and Wagnalls Company, New
York.

It would be futile to list the volumes consulted

for practically every volume of this publication from
1919 to its expiration was utilized.
were indispensable.

These volumes

Current History, Volumes 18, 21,

31 and 35, The New York Times Company, were consulted
for timely evidences of opinions as was:

~

Nation,

Volumes 127, The Nation Incorporated, New York, 1928,
and The Outlook, The Outlook Company, New York, 1924.
Congressional Digest, A. Gram Robinson and Norborne
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T. N. Robinson, Publishers, 1923.
and unusual publication.

This is an excellent

Both favorable and unfavorable

opinions of well known personalities on timely subjects
are presented With no alteration and very little
interpretation.
were employed.

Two foremost Catholic periodicals
America, Volume 53, The American

Press, New York City, 1919 and

~

Catholic World,

Volumes 141 and 150, Paulist Press,
1935 and 1939
,
respectively.

The article entitled "Editorial Comment"

gave a clear view of Catholic thought by a recognized
authority.
The following newspapers were used in compiling this
paper:

!!!!,

York Sun, New York Tribune, Chicago Daily

~

Chicago Daily Tribune and finally but by no

means the least important was The

~

York Times.

This newpaper proved to be the source of a wealth
of material.

It seemed impartial in most

objective in its viewpoint.

cas~s

and

The further utilization

of this newspaper was greatly aided through the use of
The!!! !2!! Times Index Volumes 1919 to 1939.
Published by
1919-1939.

!h!

~

!2!!

Times, Times Square, New York,

These volumes proved to be a time saver

•
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in using not only the Times but also other
available newspapers.

It was helpful in locating

a specific item and in placing an approximate date
that, that item was discussed in the newspapers
of the country.
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